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THE PERILS OF PRIVILEGE: WAIVER AND 
THE LITIGATORt 
Richard L. Marcus* 
''Except for a few privileged matters, nothing is sacred in civil litiga-
tion . ... " 1 
Because the "sacred" privileges contravene the maxim that the law 
has a right to every person's evidence, American law has set its head 
against them since the mid-nineteenth century. Even the venerable 
attorney-client privilege is available only when an elaborate series of 
requirements is satisfied,2 and courts intone that it "ought to be 
strictly construed within the narrowest possible limits consistent with 
the logic of its principle."3 A prime method for constricting the privi-
lege is waiver; courts adopting a nineteenth-century attitude are likely 
to hold that any disclosure of privileged material waives the privilege. 4 
Some commentators, meanwhile, view waiver as the way to cure de-
fects in the traditional rules of privilege by abrogating privilege protec-
tion where it is cumbersome. 5 
Waiver therefore casts a long shadow. In civil litigation, it makes 
preservation of the attorney-client privilege perilous indeed. A party 
t Copyright © 1986 by Richard L. Marcus. 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1969, Pomona College; J.D. 1972, Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley. - Ed. I am indebted to the participants in an Illinois Faculty Work-
shop that discussed these ideas, to my colleagues Tom Mengler and Ron Rotunda, who read a 
draft of this article and offered helpful suggestions, and to Ed Wilhoite, University of Illinois 
class of 1987, for research assistance. 
1. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 290 (D. Del. 1985). The court 
accordingly ordered disclosure of "one of the best-kept trade secrets in the world," 107 F.R.D. at 
289, the complete formula for Coca-Cola. The company, however, refused to tum over the 
formula. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 110 F.R.D. 363 (D. Del. 1986) (refusing to 
impose sanction of default for failure to produce formula). 
2. See, e.g., 8 J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (J. 
McNaughton ed. 1961): 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his 
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself 
or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 
3. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.) (quoting 8 J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 2291, at 554), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 929 (1963). 
4. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra. 
5. E.g .. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 206 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (privilege's "ob-
structive effect has been substantially lessened by the development of liberal doctrines as to 
waiver"). 
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may forfeit privilege protection by putting privileged matters "in is-
sue.'' During discovery, any slip-up in screening materials that are 
produced can result in waiver. Revelation to nonparties can similarly 
destroy privilege protection. In witness preparation, allowing a pro-
spective witness to examine privileged materials that relate to his or 
her testimony can destroy the protection. Despite its pervasive im-
pact, however, waiver has received little broad-based scholarly atten-
tion, 6 leaving some to conclude rather lamely that "[w]aiver can be a 
tricky concept. "7 
Waiver can be made less tricky, although it will never yield alge-
braic accuracy. Focusing on civil litigation, this article develops a 
framework for waiver decisions. It begins by stressing a factor that 
others have neglected8 - the costs generated by broad traditional 
waiver rules. These costs result largely from changes in lawyer behav-
ior to reduce waiver risks. Thus, enormous energy can be expended to 
guarantee that privileged materials are not inadvertently revealed in 
discovery, and lawyers may adopt elaborate witness preparation strat-
egies in order to prevent witnesses from seeing privileged materials. 
Judges also feel the burden; where waiver is at stake, parties will liti-
gate privilege issues that oth.erwise would not require judicial atten-
tion. Finally, for those not lucky or wealthy enough to adopt 
strategies that avoid waiver, broad waiver rules erode the reliability of 
the privilege. In recognition of these costs, courts are increasingly 
willing to enter orders preserving privilege despite disclosure in order 
to facilitate the pretrial preparation process.9 Although commenda-
ble, these orders appear totally unenforceable under classical waiver 
6. The notable and excellent exception is Developments in the Law- Privileged Communica· 
tions, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1450, 1629-65 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see also R. 
MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 545.72 (1985) (surveying grounds for waiver); 
Davidson & Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637 (1986). Other 
commentary is limited in scope. See, e.g., Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REv. 598 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Inadvertent 
Disclosure]; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure, 78 MICH. L. REV. 927 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Attorney Disclosure]; Note, Permian Corporation v. United 
States and the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations: Unjustified Severity on the Issue of 
Waiver, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 223 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unjustified Severity]; Note, 
Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege in Inter-Attorney Exchange of Information, 63 YALE L.J. 
1030 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Note, Inter-Attorney Exchange]; cf. Note, Waiver of Work Prod· 
uct Immunity, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 953. 
7. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 696 (2d ed. 1982); 
see Developments, supra note 6, at 1630 ("As the exceptions [to the rule that any disclosure works 
a waiver] have multiplied, it has become difficult to distinguish the exceptions from the rule."), 
8. But see Davidson & Voth, supra note 6, at 654, 666 (arguing that, due to the burden of 
deciding questions of privilege in complex cases, "[d]ecisions on questions of privilege may have 
a far more profound effect on the administration of justice than the decisions on questions of 
substantive law to which judges give most of their attention"). 
9. See text accompanying notes 30-35 infra. 
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doctrine. This article urges that the theory, like the courts, should 
take account of the costs; loss of privilege protection should be justi-
fied by something more than antipathy toward the privilege. 
Turning to theories for waiver, the article finds two traditional jus-
tifications wanting. One, intention, is not a useful guide because truly 
intentional waivers are extremely rare. Indeed, waiver is often found 
even though the act upon which it is premised (such as inadvertent 
production in discovery) was not itself intended. The other, flowing 
from the general desire to restrict the privilege, is to limit confidential-
ity to situations where it is essential by treating any act inconsistent 
with the purpose of the privilege as a waiver. However, this attitude 
disregards the costs of a broad rule of waiver. More significantly, it 
assumes certainty about how the purpose of the privilege should be 
applied where no certainty actually exists. The traditional utilitarian 
rationale for the purpose is easily stated: the privilege promotes full 
disclosure by the client to the lawyer. But this can be applied very 
literally, often providing a pretext, not a reason, for finding a waiver. 
At the extreme, for example, the purpose l3:nalysis can narrow privilege 
protection to a litmus test resembling the Miranda warnings, protect-
ing only those disclosures the client wquld not have made absent pro-
tection.10 Few endorse this position, however, and the Supreme 
Court's privilege decisions seem to be moving in another direction, 
blending attorney-client privilege with work product.11 Ultimately the 
purpose analysis seems inherently to invite unduly literal decisions 
that inflate the cost of waiver, 12 and it is therefore preferable to look 
for a reason, rather than a pretext, for finding a waiver. 
What remains is fairness, which courts increasingly invoke as a 
basis for waivers. But fairness is an extraordinarily elastic term, and 
the existence of the privilege may well be labeled unfair. The distin-
guishing feature in waiver cases, however, is some further act charac-
terized as a waiver. This article therefore concludes that the focus 
should be on unfairness flowing from the act on which the waiver is 
premised. Thus focused, the principal concern is selective use of privi-
leged material to garble the truth, which mandates giving the oppo-
nent access to related privileged material to set the record straight. 
Since this insight advances the discussion little, this article pro-
ceeds to examine the specific litigation contexts in which waiver issues 
recur to explain how the fairness principle should be applied. This 
10. The Miranda warnings image comes from Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Law-
yers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 606-09 (1980). 
11. See text accompanying notes 87-90 & 98-106 infra. 
12. See text accompanying notes 107-21 infra. 
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analysis shows that courts have distorted waiver doctrine to abrogate 
privilege on the ground that privileged material is "in issue" where in 
reality there is no risk of truth garbling and the motivation behind 
waiver decisions is dislike for the privilege itself. Contrary to accepted 
dogma that all disclosures work a waiver, the article suggests that 
there is no reason for treating disclosure to opponents or others as a 
waiver unless there is legitimate concern about truth garbling or the 
material has become so notorious that decision without that material 
risks making a mockery of justice. Finally, it explores the competing 
fairness concerns in witness preparation and argues for careful atten-
tion by courts to avoid broad invasions into privilege on this ground. 
Although such case-by-case determinations can be difficult, they are 
preferable to the sort of hair-trigger waiver decisions that result from 
nineteenth-century rigidity about the privilege. 
Having explored the application of the fairness principle in recur-
ring litigation contexts, this article concludes by examining two "slip-
pery slope" objections that could be raised to the emerging fairness 
analysis. These objections, oddly enough, foresee that the fairness ori-
entation will erode the privilege because fairness decisions are inher-
ently ad hoc and because they turn on need, which could undermine 
the supposed absoluteness of the privilege. On examination, however, 
these objections offer no reason for abandoning the flexibility of fair-
ness, which operates to preserve privilege where it would otherwise be 
lost. 
I. THE COSTLY IMPACT OF BROAD WAIVER RULES 
Many lawyers are acutely aware of the waiver risks involved in 
litigation.13 Thus, although there are serious doubts about the extent 
to which the attorney-client privilege affects client behavior,14 there 
can be little doubt that waiver rules affect lawyers' handling of 
litigation,15 particularly discovery, in ways that cause a number of 
13. The lengths to which lawyers go to avoid waivers, see text accompanying notes 22-29 
infra, evidence this concern. The recurrence of the subject on continuing legal education pro· 
grams also shows the level of attention the subject receives. E.g., Glekel, Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and Work Product Privilege, in FOURTH ANNUAL CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE 337, 344-46 
(Law Journal Seminars 1985); Hellerstein & Ringel, Current Problems About the Attorney-Clielll 
Privilege, in 1 REsOURCE MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND 
STATE CoURTS 87, 123-32 (1st ed. 1981). Beyond that, the practitioners' literature is full of 
advice on the subject. See, e.g., Miller, Preserving the Privilege, LITIGATION, Summer 1984, at 
20; Thornburg, Attorney-Client Privilege: Issue-Related Waivers, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 1039, 1050 
(1985) (attorneys should be "ever mindful" of risk of waiver). 
14. See notes 74-77 infra and accompanying text. 
15. Of course, some lawyers do not worry about waiver and therefore do not protect the 
confidentiality of privileged materials, often because the stakes do not justify the substantial ef-
forts required to avoid a waiver. See, e.g., Rotunda, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 622, 625 
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costs.16 Nevertheless, academic discussions of waiver pay little heed 
to these costs, seemingly because they view the problem as entirely 
theoretical.17 The theory should take account of this reality. 
To appreciate the effects of broad waiver rules, one must begin by 
realizing the consequences of a finding of waiver. Where disclosure of 
privileged material operates as a waiver, the waiver ordinarily goes 
beyond the disclosure in two ways. First, it is effective as to all related 
matters, precluding later assertion of the privilege as to any material 
related to the same subject. 18 Second, with regard to all this material, 
it is effective as to the whole world because the privilege, once waived, 
cannot be resurrected.19 Thus, revelation of a single privileged item to 
A results in waiver not only as to all related items as to A, but also to 
B, C: etc. With broad discovery rules, 20 such revelation is not limited 
to the central issues in the client's dispute with A. Instead, the ambit 
of discovery may include a great deal of material only tangentially 
related to the present case that might be central in another case. It 
should be apparent that a great deal is at stake.21 
A. Increasing Litigation Costs 
The risk of waiver can lead to the expenditure of extraordinary 
amounts of energy (and money) to avoid waiver, particularly in dis-
covery. Perhaps the archetypical example is Transamerica Computer 
Co. v. International Business Machines Corp., 22 in which Transamerica 
(1976) (many lawyers lose privilege due to ignorance oflimits on its protection); Note, The Attor-
ney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 179, 180-81 
(1972) (survey indicating many lawyers unaware of risks to privilege posed by sharing informa-
tion with other lawyers). These situations are not cost-free; they raise concerns abo_ut favoring 
the rich, see text accompanying notes 41-46 infra, and undermining client confidence in the privi-
lege, see text accompanying notes 51-56 infra. 
16. Not all these types of costs arise in every litigation context. Thus, where a party loses the 
privilege for putting a matter "in issue," there is very little avoidance behavior available except 
withdrawing the claim or defense involved. Obviously, in that case the waiver rule causes differ-
ent costs. 
17. In other areas, the costs of procedural rules do affect their interpretation. See, e.g., Mar-
cus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 433, 444-51 (1986) (unanticipated costs of relaxed pleadings scrutiny cause courts to revive 
fact pleading). 
18. See notes 126-27 infra and accompanying text. This consequence may not follow where 
the waiver is based on use of materials in witness preparation. See note 225 infra. 
19. See note 2 supra. 
20. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(l) (allowing discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"). 
21. "The waiver doctrine entails the result of waiver not only of the claim for the particular 
document, but for any other document relating to the same subject matter. For this reason the 
risk it poses is enormous." Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in Mas-
sive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 375, 399-
400. 
22. 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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argued that IBM had waived the privilege by producing some 5800 
pages of privileged material during discovery in a suit against IBM by 
Control Data Corporation (CDC). In the CDC case, the trial judge 
had ordered IBM to produce some seventeen million pages of material 
within ninety days. IBM thereupon mounted what the Ninth Circuit 
called a "herculean effort"23 to cull privileged items from this mass of 
material. It hired outside help to examine each page of material to 
identify items that appeared to be privileged. This process would have 
taken 34,000 hours at 500 pages per hour, probably a high rate of 
speed for this task since these seventeen million documents were "par-
ticularly difficult to screen for privilege."24 Having located seemingly 
privileged documents, these reviewers would alert a lawyer; who 
would make an initial examination. If the document seemed privi-
leged, it would be passed along to another lawyer who would deter-
mine whether it was wholly or partly privileged, in which case a partly 
masked copy had to be made and returned to the original location of 
the document.25 Finally, IBM stationed a lawyer (colorfully known as 
the "Interceptor") in the document production room to try to catch 
any privileged documents that had slipped through.26 Faced with this 
enormous effort, the Ninth Circuit held that no waiver had occurred; 
even though Judge Edelstein in New York had earlier reached the op-
posite result. 27 
Obviously, there are few cases comparable in magnitude to Trans-
america, but the added effort caused by the risk of waiver is significant 
in many cases. The advent of photocopying machines, computers, and 
23. 573 F.2d at 648. 
24. 573 F.2d at 648. The court explained that the documents were "letters and memoranda 
.•. randomly strewn throughout various IBM branch offices and divisional headquarters." 573 
F.2d at 648. A bit of reflection suggests the difficulties that attend efforts to cull privileged 
materials. Often they do not bear indicia of privilege, and they may be interspersed with innocu-
ous materials. Consider, for example, a handwritten note saying, "Carol called to say that she 
sees no AT problems with the Amalgamated deal if we handle it as she suggested." If Carol is a 
lawyer, and AT means antitrust, the note is probably privileged, but it is obviously hard to 
identify as such. Finding and properly indentifying this note could well be a great challenge, but 
failure to do so could easily result in waiver. 
25. 573 F.2d at 648-49. 
26. 573 F.2d at 649. 
27. Judge Edelstein ordered IBM to turn the documents over to the government in its mo· 
nopolization suit against IBM. This order resulted in a litigation odyssey. A panel of the Second 
Circuit vacated the order because "[i]t is clear to us beyond peradventure that the delivery of the 
documents pursuant to the Minnesota court order did not constitute a waiver by IBM." IBM v. 
United States, 471 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1972). This ruling was reversed en bane on the ground 
the court of appeals had no appellate jurisdiction. IBM v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 
1973) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 979, 980 (1974). Meanwhile, IBM refused to produce the 
documents, Judge Edelstein fined it $150,000 per day for contempt, and the Second Circuit again 
refused to review his decision, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. IBM v. United States, 493 F.2d 
112 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974). 
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other technological advances means that there is a great deal of addi-
tional material that must be culled in responding to discovery. The 
increasing incursion of regulation into everyday affairs means that 
there is a heightened possibility that this material will be privileged.28 
Even without broad waiver rules, parties would be likely to make sub-
stantial efforts to extract privileged materials because they would pre-
fer not to tum over anything they can withhold. It · is unlikely, 
however, that similar exertion would be required were it not for the 
risk of a waiver as to the world.29 The question, then, is whether the 
added effort is worth it. 
Many courts think it is not. 30 In increasing numbers, they have 
entered orders, often on stipulation, that provide that inadvertent pro-
duction of privileged material through discovery is not a waiver. For 
example, the judge in the CDC case entered such an order early in 
document production before ordering the "Interceptor" out 'of the 
document production room.31 In Transamerica, the Ninth Circuit 
found that this order made it "obvious" that IBM did not waive privi-
leges as to documents produced thereafter.32 More generally, courts 
and litigants view such orders as devices to reduce the burden of 
screening material and thereby streamline the discovery process. 33 In 
service to that goal, some courts enforce such protective agreements 
28. It may also be that litigants are asking for privileged material more often. See Davidson, 
Judicial Procedures for Resolving Claims of Privilege, LmGATION, Summer 1982, at 36, 36: 
"Twenty years ago, a document request made no mention of privileged documents: it was con-
sidered ungentlemanly to ask one's adversary about his communications with his client. Now, 
however, privileged documents are called for by virtually every request .... " 
29. See id. ("If you are tempted to avoid the cost [of asserting privilege] by simply producing 
the uninteresting privileged documents, remember that the broad and vague doctrines of waiver 
make this a hazardous course."). 
30. See, e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982), in which the 
court rejected the argument that the privilege should be found inapplicable because the materials 
in question had not been stored in a special confidential file: "To hold otherwise would be to 
require every corporation to maintain at least two sets of files. Moreover, a screening committee 
would then have to be set up whereby some designated official could pass on the need of each 
employee to know the contents of any requested document." 93 F.R.D. at 142. But cf 
Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant so careless in 
maintaining confidentiality that privilege waived). 
31. Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1233, 1234 (D. Minn. 
1972). 
32. 573 F.2d at 652. 
33. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981); West-
ern Fuels Assn. v. Burlington N. R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 204 (D. Wyo. 1984); James Julian, Inc. 
v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 140 & n.1 (D. Del. 1982); Jorstad v. IDS Realty Trust, 489 F. 
Supp. 1180, 1184 n.1 (D. Minn. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 643 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1981); 
cf United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("If the defendant's attor-
neys wished to avoid an inadvertent waiver during pre-indictment negotiations, they could have 
agreed in advance with the Government's attorneys that any disclosure would be 'without 
prejudice.' "). · 
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even though not reduced to a court order.34 It appears that these ef-
forts do reduce the cost and delay that would otherwise result from 
broad waiver rules. 35 
But the stipulation or order approach is inconsistent with classical 
waiver doctrine, which holds that any disclosure to an outsider de-
stroys the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the parties have 
agreed in advance that disclosure should not have that effect, with or 
without the court's blessing, has no bearing on that conclusion.36 
Even if such an agreement estops the recipient of the material from 
. claiming waiver, it would have no effect on a nonparty's right to claim 
the disclosure established waiver. Yet the courts choose to disregard 
this theoretical glitch, presumably because the concrete reality of pro-
tracted discovery is more immediate than the abstract operation of 
classical waiver doctrine. 37 Rather than perpetuate uncertainty about 
the effectiveness of such orders, 38 it would be better to declare them 
enforceable even though theoretically untidy;39 otherwise the courts 
34. In Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the court accepted a 
"special method of discovery" adopted by the parties providing there would be no waiver "unless 
expressed in writing," reasoning: ''The court can perceive no sound reason of public policy to 
rewrite an agreement which facilitates disclosure, closely protects a legitimate privilege, and con-
templates a cooperative effort by both parties." 61 F.R.D. at 42-43. Other courts have enforced 
such agreements in the absence of an order. See Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 439-40 
(D.D.C. 1984) (stipulation at deposition); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 
357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) (agreement that compliance with subpoena would not constitute a 
waiver). 
35. Thus Professors Hazard and Rice, acting as special masters in an exceptionally large 
case, extolled the virtues of the nonwaiver order entered in the case: "By eliminating the risk of 
inadvertent waiver through the production of documents, the order eliminated the necessity of 
hypercareful scrutiny of each document prior to its disclosure ..•• This [order] permitted rela-
tively free exchange of the exceptionally large mass of demanded and subpoenaed materials." 
Hazard & Rice, supra note 21, at 399-400; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITJGATION, SEC-
OND § 21.432 (1985) (supplement to c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE (1969-1985)) (agreement preserving privilege "may facilitate the discovery process"). 
36. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra. Accordingly, in Chubb Integrated Sys. v. Na-
tional Bank, 103 F.R.D. 52 (D.D.C. 1984), the court refused to enforce such a stipulation 
although it acknowledged that the agreement was "for the mutual convenience of the parties, 
saving the time and cost of pre-inspection screening." 103 F.R.D. at 67-68. It concluded that 
these considerations counted for nothing in the face of the accepted dogma that "the attomey-
client privilege should be available only at the traditional price: a litigant must maintain genuine 
confidentiality." 103 F.R.D. at 67 (citations omitted); accord, Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. 
Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). 
37. Cf. Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Ltd., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986), in which the court 
upheld an "umbrella" protective order that did not require document-by-document justification 
of confidentiality, reasoning that "the document-by-document approach may be so costly that it 
may make large-scale litigation too expensive for all but the most affiuent parties." 785 F.2d at 
1122 n.18; see also Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 589 (1984) 
("Those who are not rich often cannot afford litigation on the scale for which the system is 
designed."). 
38. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITJGATION, SECOND, supra note 35, § 21.432 (1985) 
(enforceability of such orders "not clear"). 
39. See Davidson & Voth, supra note 6, at 655 (footnotes omitted): 
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are in effect deceiving litigants about their rights. 40 However this issue 
is ultimately resolved, the duplicity involved in entering such orders 
points up the unsuitability of the rigid waiver doctrine to the actual 
problems of modem litigation. 
B. Favoring the Rich 
A second cost of broad waiver rules derives from the first: Not 
only do these rules promote overexpenditure to avoid a waiver, they 
also prefer the rich litigant over the poor one. Transamerica again il-
lustrates the extreme - few private litigants could spend as lavishly 
on discovery screening as IBM, or have as great an incentive to do so 
in view of the likelihood of collateral litigation. But a simple estimate 
of the cost of IBM's review41 suggests the reality that some litigants 
will be unable to finance such efforts. 
Discovery is not the only realm in which a well-heeled litigant can 
reduce or eliminate risks of waiver by committing more resources to 
the litigation. Witness preparation provides another good example.42 
Ideally, witness preparation involves a face-to-face encounter between 
the trial lawyer and the witness to review the matters that will be cov-
ered in direct testimony and the subjects likely to be covered in cross-
examination. This ideal is relatively immune to snooping by the oppo-
sition, because witness preparation is generally treated as work prod-
uct. 43 But where the witness is busy with ongoing business, spending 
time with the lawyer is likely to look unattractive.44 Even clients resist 
efforts by their own lawyers to get their attention.45 Moreover, unless 
the lawyer and the witness are located nearby, one of them has to 
The single reform of giving effect, in subsequent litigation, to a stipulation or order pro-
viding that inadvertent production will not constitute a waiver, would greatly simplify the 
task of resolving privilege claims. Thousands of arguably privileged documents of innocu-
ous content would no longer have to be withheld out of fear that their production would 
effect a broad subject matter waiver. 
40. Of course, such orders are often requested by the parties and granted to accommodate 
them. But there is surely something deceptive about entering an order that cannot do what it 
claims to do. 
41. See text accompanying note 24 supra. At five dollars per hour, the initial screening 
would have cost $170,000. The cost in attorney time could, of course, be much higher. 
42. For a detailed examination of the waiver problems presented in the witness preparation 
situation, see text accompanying notes 199-225 infra. 
43. See note 212 infra. 
44. Cf Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 226 
(1985) (discussing loss of management time as additional cost oflitigation); Coffee, The Unfaith-
ful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1985, at 5, 15 (same). 
45. See Olson, Dispute Resolution: An Alternative for Large Case Litigation, LITIGATION, 
Winter 1980, at 22, 24 (describing tendency of corporate managers to give up and leave the 
matter to the lawyers when business dispute is litigated). 
J 
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travel to meet with the other, adding that expense to the cost in wit-
ness time and lawyer time for extensive preparation sessions. 
For a litigant with large resources, like IBM, these impediments 
can usually be overcome. IBM employees can be relieved of assign-
ments for whatever time is required to consult with the lawyer, who 
can be sent around the world, if necessary, to meet with the witness. 
Litigants who are not so well-heeled may have to employ cheaper 
means that result in the creation of documents. For example, where 
the lawyer is in San Francisco and the busy client/witness is in New 
York, the lawyer may have no practical alternative to sending the cli-
ent a memorandum summarizing the material developed to date 
through discovery and setting out likely lines of inquiry. This method 
is not as effective as face-to-face review,46 but it is so much cheaper in 
lawyer and client time that most litigants may have little practical 
alternative. 
To the extent the price for using cheap alternatives is to waive a 
privilege that would otherwise protect material, waiver rules not only 
promote needless expenditure on litigation but also give those litigants 
who can afford such expenditures an advantage (in increased protec-
tion of privileged material) over their adversaries. 
C. Judicial Burden 
Resolving disputes about privilege can be time-consuming. One 
judge, having completed determination of privilege disputes regarding 
thousands of documents, described it as "the most arduous task [the 
court] has ever undertaken in its 26 years of public service."47 Judges 
can shift that burden to magistrates or masters who can, in tum, re-
duce it by insisting on burdensome procedures to claim a privilege.48 
But those procedures further escalate the cost to the party of claiming 
privilege. 
Much of this judicial effort is unnecessary. To some extent, of 
course, litigants will claim privilege whether or not the failure to do so 
results in a waiver. But broad rules of waiver add substantially to the 
46. See text accompanying notes 214-16 infra. 
47. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1192 (D.S.C. 1975). The 
court had spent twenty-five days on in camera inspection of documents, and the review process 
yielded, among other things, a 405-page index. 397 F. Supp. at 1189. For other examples of 
burden, see Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 157 (D. Del. 1977) (court's ruling 
based on "a careful comparison of the disputed documents with those that have been produced"); 
Wolfram, The Antibiotic Class Actions, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 251, 314-15 ("Various 
privileges were claimed as to several hundred thousand documents."). See generally Davidson, 
supra note 28. 
48. E.g., Hazard & Rice, supra note 21, at 400-05 (describing procedures imposed by special 
masters on claims of privilege). 
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effort required by these claims of privilege because they force the par-
ties to fight about things they would otherwise not dispute.49 Beyond 
that, broad waiver doctrines will tempt parties to press claims of 
waiver even where chances of success are small, owing to the potential 
windfall that success would bring. 50 The courts' willingness to en-
dorse stipulations against waiver is a recognition that waiver imposes 
these costs. 
D. Undermining Confidence in Privilege 
There are real doubts about the extent to which the attorney-client 
privilege actually promotes client disclosure to lawyers,51 but the priv-
ilege does allow the lawyer to assure the client that everything will be 
held in confidence. The erosion that results from waiver must some-
times make that assurance seem hollow.52 Those who are antagonistic 
to privilege could defend this as a cost-free way to promote full disclo-
sure through empty assurances, while still allowing access to evidence. 
But this sophistry is too clever by half. Having once lost privilege 
protection due to waiver, will the client again be willing to trust the 
lawyer's assurances? Will other clients, although fully aware of the 
protections of the privilege, remain entirely ignorant of the risk that 
these protections will be lost due to waiver? The actual operation of 
the waiver doctrine would seem unavoidably to undermine confidence 
in the privilege by invading initially privileged communications. 
One antidote would be to forbid waiver, thereby making the attor-
ney-client communication truly sacrosanct. Indeed, it seems that the 
Romans once took such a position, absolutely forbidding the lawyer to 
testify, even on behalf of his client.53 But such rigidity would be too 
costly; not surprisingly, early American waiver cases often involved 
situations in which the waiver was necessary to advance the client's 
interests. 54 If waiver must be allowed when the client wants it, it will 
49. See note 29 supra. 
50. Cf Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 891 (1983) 
("The potential benefit to be derived from discovery of an opponent's work product is such that a 
party may attempt to make a waiver argument even when he knows his chances for success are 
minimal."). 
51. See text accompanying notes 74-77 infra. 
52. Compare Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosures, Less Privilege, 54 
U. COLO. L. REV. SJ, 59 (1982) ("There is also a large measure of fiction ... in the assumption 
that clients now are fairly warned of the limits of confidentiality."), with Saltzburg, Communica-
tions Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 low AL. REV. 811, 813 (1981) (asserting 
that most attorneys will tell client early on about the privilege). 
53. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 487, 488-89 (1928). 
54. E.g., Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175 (1865), where a dispute arose after 
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also occur sometimes when the client does not want it, thereby eroding 
the reliability of the privilege. 
The extent of this erosion is difficult to gauge. Client confidence in 
the sanctity of the attorney-client communication may be fostered by 
assurances from counsel that everything will be held in confidence. To 
the extent that waivers result from mistakes by counsel, ss it would not 
seem that counsel must mention the risk of mistake to the client, so 
that the scenario that should induce client confidence need not change 
due to the possibility of waiver. Indeed, if the client believed the law-
yer likely to make mistakes, he would doubtless lose confidence in 
more important aspects of the lawyer's services than the absolute guar-
antee of confidentiality. At the same time, the spectre of waiver can-
not be irrelevant to the sophisticated client, and it should not be 
irrelevant to waiver decisions. S6 
E. Costs Versus Benefits 
It is certainly true that in given cases broad waiver rules make 
available evidence, possibly critical, that would not otherwise be avail-
able. 57 In far too many instances, however, a hair-trigger approach to 
waiver results in a broad incursion into privileged material without 
any corresponding advantage, at least to the litigants in that case. 
Moreover, the number of cases in which waiver achieves important 
benefits must be weighed against the number of cases in which broad 
waiver rules impede litigation efficiency and burden the litigation 
process.58 
the testator's death and his lawyer offered to testify about what the testator told him before the 
will was prepared. The Court held the testimony admissible on waiver principles: 
The client may waive the protection of the rule. The waiver may be express or implied. We 
think it as effectual here by implication as the most explicit language could have made it. It 
could have been no clearer if the client had expressly enjoined it upon the attorney to give 
this testimony whenever the truth of his testamentary declaration should be challenged by 
any of those to whom it related. 
70 U.S. at 194. 
SS. In theory the privilege can only be waived by the client, not the lawyer, but in fact waiver 
often results from actions by the lawyer, who is considered to be an agent authorized to waive. 
S6. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., S31 F. Supp. 9Sl, 9SS (N.D. 111. 1982) (emphasis 
in original): "[l]f we are serious about the attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client's 
welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed 
to have given up the privilege." 
S7. Cf. Miller, supra note 13, at 20 ("Whether you successfully invoke the attorney-client 
privilege can make or break a case."). 
S8. The enumeration of costs in the text is not all-inclusive; other costs can surface. For 
example, when confronted by the argument that a litigator's response to an auditor's request for 
information on pending litigation is a waiver, see text accompanying notes 178-81 infra, some 
corporate officials suggested that the response would be to hire 11110 sets of attorneys on major 
cases - one to advise the auditors and the other to handle the actual litigation. Moore, DOE 
Seeks Litigation Analyses Prepared by Corporate Lawyers, Legal Times, Nov. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 
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We must therefore turn to justifications for finding waivers; unless 
there is some reason for finding a waiver, the possibility that there will 
be a benefit seems insufficient to warrant the systemic costs described 
above. The task of identifying justifications for removal of privilege 
protection is somewhat complicated by the fact that the word 
"waiver" is used for a wide variety of purposes in civil59 and criminal6o 
cases. Whether or not a single theory of waiver can be fashioned for 
these diverse situations, 61 there are in connection with privilege only a 
few theoretical grounds for removing its protection. 
II. INTENTIONAL WAIVER 
The word waiver conjures up images of voluntary relinquishment 
of a known right. 62 That is the focus of the criminal guilty-plea cases, 
where the courts ask whether the defendant was fully aware of his 
rights, 63 leading to a rather elaborate ritual that attends the taking of a 
guilty plea. 64 This approach can be applied to civil litigation issues as 
well; where a party to a contract has agreed to entry of a judgment 
without notice, or to suit in a distant court, courts may determine the 
enforceability of this provision by examining circumstances bearing on 
voluntariness and notice. 65 
2, at 7; see also Becker, The Use of Experts in Pretrial Discovery, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL 
CASES 1, 20 (M. Kraft 2d ed. 1982) (suggesting using two experts, one for consultation and one 
to testify, to minimize need to disclose communications with experts). Similar duplication of 
legal expense could occur in other situations. Where attorney-client communications are discov-
erable because plaintiff seeks to avoid the statute of limitations by relying on a tolling doctrine, 
for example (see note 131 infra), plaintiff's lawyer may become a witness and therefore be dis-
qualified to represent plaintiff at trial. Cf Temple v. Reese, 109 F.R.D. 1 (D. Neb. 1985) (dis-
qualifying attorneys for plaintiff who were listed as trial witnesses on tolling issue). 
59. For example, a party who fails to object to personal jurisdiction, venue, or service of 
process at the earliest possible time waives the objection. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h). Similarly, a 
party waives the right to jury trial by failing to make a timely demand for one. FED. R. Civ. P. 
38(d). A party may even waive the right to notice of a claim or trial on the merits. See, e.g., 
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972) (by signing cognovit note, ware-
housing company waived right to notice and hearing prior to entry of judgment). 
60. For discussion of the problems in criminal cases, see, for example, Westen, Away from 
Waiver: A Ratio11alefor the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 MICH. 
L. REV. 1214 (1977); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Law: A Brief for a More Careful Analysis, 55 
TEXAS L. REV. 193 (1977); Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term - Foreword: Waiver of 
Co11stitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1970). 
61. For an effort to develop such a general theory, see Rubin, Toward a General Theory of 
Waiver. 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981). Despite the breadth of this undertaking, it does not 
address the problem of waiver of privilege. 
62. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
63. Some have questioned the extent to which courts actually credit such matters despite 
claiming to focus on them. See Dix, Waiver as an Independent Aspect of Criminal Procedure: 
Some Comments on Professor Westen's Suggestion, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 67; Note, Waiver of 
the Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 14 STAN. L. REV. 811, 813 (1962). 
64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
65. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1974). 
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On occasion, similar analysis supports a finding of waiver of an 
evidentiary privilege. Consider, for example, the recent decision by 
San Diego financier J. David Dominelli to waive his attorney-client 
privilege in connection with civil litigation growing out of the failure 
of his J. David investment firm, seemingly in hopes of influencing the 
judge in his criminal case to lighten his sentence. 66 Investors were able 
to use the waiver to good effect in discovery to extract information 
from partners of the New York law firm Rogers & Wells, which they 
were suing because of its role in representing the J. David investment 
firm. The firm ultimately settled for a reported forty million dollars. 67 
But the number of situations in which this analysis applies to waivers 
of privilege is quite limited. As Wigmore recognized, "A privileged 
person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to aban-
don could alone control the situation."68 Indeed, even where a waiver 
is voluntary and knowing, the courts are unlikely to enforce it if the 
privilege-holder changes his mind before the actual disclosure.69 
Although truly intentional waiver is rare in privilege cases, courts 
often talk of attempting to discern the privilege-holder's intention. 70 
These assertions are misleading. Instead, the anaiysis is often whether 
the fact that the privilege-holder has disclosed privileged material 
shows that he never actually intended that it be held in confidence, 
thus defeating one predicate for initial application of the privilege. 
This analysis highlights the privilege-holder's intention to do the act 
which is relied upon by the court to justify a finding of waiver. But 
even then the privilege-holder's abiding desire to preserve the privilege 
often counts for nothing against the fact of unintended disclosure, 
66. Galante, Firm Loses Privilege in J. David Suits, Natl. L.J., July 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1. 
67. Galante, Rogers & Wells Will Pay $40M, Natl. L.J., Mar. 3, 1986, at 3, col. 1, at SO 
(explaining that "a series of potentially devastating admissions" occurred in discovery). Galante, 
supra note 66, reported that Mr. Dominelli's waiver was revealed as a surprise in the deposition 
of a Rogers & Wells partner. For further details on the difficulties Rogers & Wells encountered 
due to the waiver, see Masters, Rogers & Wells Partners Conflict in Testimony on J. David Case, 
Legal Times, Sept. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2. 
68. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2327, at 636. 
69. There is admittedly little authority on the subject. See United States v. Aronoff, 466 F. 
Supp. 855, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Natlee Draft Horse Co. v. Cripe & Co., 142 Ky. 810, 135 S.W. 
292 (1911); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 219, 220-21 (1945); cf. Simons, Rescinding a Waiver of a Consti-
tutional Right, 68 GEO. L.J. 919 (1980). But cf. Fellman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 
55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (consent to trial before magistrate under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) cannot be 
withdrawn). 
70. For example, in Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 
(N.D. Ill. 1981), plaintiff's employees pilfered drafts of letters to counsel from a trash dumpster 
outside defendants' office. The court found that defendants had lost privilege protection by fail-
ing to shred the documents before depositing them in the trash, reasoning that "the relevant 
consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the confidentiality of the documents as 
manifested in the precautions they took." 91 F.R.D. at 260 (footnote omitted). Such invocation 
of intent robs the concept of all meaning. 
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although the absence of intention may cause courts to narrow the 
waiver. At most, then, intention functions as a basis for limiting the 
scope of the waiver that results from an unintended act. 
III. ACT INCONSISTENT WITH PURPOSE OF PRIVILEGE 
As we saw at the beginning, courts use a purpose analysis to con-
fine the privilege as narrowly as possible. 71 This approach leads to the 
common explanation that a waiver is an act inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the privilege.72 Since the early nineteenth century, the ac-
cepted purpose for the privilege has been the one prompted by 
Bentham's utilitarian criticisms of evidence law - that the privilege is 
designed solely to stimulate the client to make a full disclosure to the 
lawyer.73 This Part explains why reference to the purpose of the privi-
lege does not provide a satisfactory guide in waiver decisions. The 
central problem is that the utilitarian rationale is not a workable stan-
dard, as demonstrated by decisions involving other privilege issues. 
Beyond that, the purpose analysis is unpromising as. a solution for 
waiver problems because an alternative purpose is unlikely to be an-
nounced in the foreseeable future and l?ecause the purpose analysis 
tends to lead to broad waiver rules without affording any leeway to 
cope with the resulting. costs. Accordingly, the better focus would be 
on purposes for waiver rather than on using the purposes of the privi-
lege to decide waiver issues. 
A. Problems with the Traditional Utilitarian Analysis 
The first problem with the utilitarian analysis is that it rests on a 
shaky assumption. There has never been empirical evidence that the 
privilege's existence actually promotes disclosure by clients, 74 and 
there are intuitive reasons for doubting that it often does so. Lawyers 
71. See text accompanying note 3 supra. 
72. E.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("A simple principle unites 
the various applications of the implied waiver doctrine. Courts need not allow a claim of privi-
lege when the party claiming the privilege seeks to use it in a way that is not consistent with the 
purpose of the privilege.") (footnote omitted). 
73. Thus, in Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826), the Court, speaking 
through Justice Story, found the privilege limited to "facts ... communicated by a client to 
counsel, solely on account of that relation." 
74. ;See, e.g., Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court 
Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 112 (1956) (disclosure-promotion theory premised on "sheer specu-
lation"); Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar 
Cases: Gamer Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 822 (1984) (privilege based on "an educated 
guess about behavior"); Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: 
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 11 YALE L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962) 
("The mythical average American is, as likely as not, either misinformed or uninformed about 
the attorney-client privilege.") (footnote omitted). 
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can emphasize the existence of the privilege to their clients, 75 and 
sometimes clients insist upon being reassured that it will apply,76 but 
few clients probably place great importance on the privilege in decid-
ing what to tell the lawyer. Moreover, since the lawyer can emphasize 
that full disclosure is essential to valid legal advice,77 the risk of non-
disclosure is likely to seem as great as the risk of disclosure. Thus, one 
begins with uncertainty about whether the privilege is really necessary 
to accomplish the stated purpose. 
These difficulties are reflected in the application of the privilege. A 
strict utilitarian analysis could limit the privilege's application to those 
disclosures that the client would not have made absent the privilege, 
seemingly requiring parsing of the attorney-client communications 
and psychoanalysis of the client. 78 Taking such an approach, some 
courts have urged that the privilege would apply to what the lawyer 
told the client only to the extent that disclosure of the lawyer's advice 
would also reveal what the client told the lawyer.79 Not surprisingly, 
most have not gone so far, 80 and the actual application of the privilege 
shows that a strict purpose analysis is not employed. 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 81 the Supreme Court's 1981 rejection 
of the "control group" limitation on the privilege for a corporate cli-
75. See Saltzburg, supra note 52, at 813-14 (client may rely on privilege because attorney tells 
him about it). 
76. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 
389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (two participants in meeting with co-defendants refuse to proceed until 
assured privilege will apply). 
77. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981) (corporations must constantly 
get legal advice to cope with "vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation"); G. HAZ-
ARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 140-41 (1978) (describing compelling pressures to get 
legal advice). 
78. For commentary suggesting such an approach, see Weissenberger, Toward Precision in 
the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 918-19 
(1980) (urging adoption of but-for analysis under which privilege attaches only if statement 
would not have been made absent privilege); cf. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Cor-
porate Attorney-Client Privilege, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 480 (1982) ("An ideal privilege would 
generate no costs because all protected information would be undisclosed absent the privilege."); 
Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the A ttorney·Client Privilege 
in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982) ("If clients 
themselves divulge such information to third parties, chances are that they would also have di-
vulged it to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege."); Note, supra note 63, 
at 813 (waiver finding based on ·~udicial mind reading"). 
79. E.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 
(1963); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1982); SCM Corp. v. Xerox 
Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 520-23 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976). 
80. See Sobel, The Confidential Communication Elemelll of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 
CARDOZO L. REV. 649 (1983) (arguing for covering all attorney advice); 2 D. LOUISELL & c. 
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 209, at 738-39 (rev. ed. 1985) (attorney's statement within 
privilege); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 89 (better reasoned cases protect attorney 
communications). 
81. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
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ent, exemplifies the current uncertainty about the purposes of the priv-
ilege. Outwardly the opinion is unabashedly utilitarian. 82 But the real 
focus is different; the Court was looking at the motivations of the law-
yer, not the client. It therefore stressed the lawyer's ethical obligation 
to be fully informed83 and the "Robson's choice" that would result for 
him if communications with lower-level employees were not covered 
by the privilege. 84 Against this concern, it found the risk of creating a 
broad "zone of silence" insignificant, because application of the privi-
lege would put the corporation's opponents in no worse position than 
if the communications had never occurred. 85 It concluded by invok-
ing "the policies served by the attorney-client privilege" and quoting 
Justice Jackson's famous epigram from Hickman v. Taylor that discov-
ery should not enable lawyers to rely "on wits borrowed from the 
adversary."86 
Upjohn cannot be explained as a decision concerned solely with 
promoting full disclosure by the client; it instead assumes the pro-
tected nature of the lawyer's advice. 87 More significantly, it disregards 
real questions about the premise that the privilege is necessary in order 
to encourage lower-level employees to talk to the corporation's lawyer. 
It has long been recognized that the employee may have different in-
terests from the corporation, particularly where an investigation of the 
employee's actions is under way. 88 In those circumstances, the corpo-
ration's right to shield communications between the lawyer and the 
employee provides cold comfort to the employee, because the corpora-
tion can use the information to discipline the employee or waive the 
privilege and tum the employee's revelations over to the authorities. 
But the Upjohn Court was little interested in these issues, and it re-
fused even to hold that the privilege was inapplicable to communica-
tions with former employees.89 Similarly, it rejected the government's 
argument that the privilege was unnecessary to prompt full disclosure 
82. Thus, the Court explained that the purpose "is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients." 449 U.S. at 389. 
83. 449 U.S. at 390-91 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 
(1979)). 
84. 449 U.S. at 391-92 (quoting Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 
1978)). 
85. 449 U.S. at 395. 
86. 449 U.S. at 396 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
87. 449 U.S. at 390 (privilege protects "the giving of professional advice"). 
88. E.g., O'Leary, Criminal Antitrust and the Corporate Executive: The Man in the Middle, 
63 A.B.A. J. 1389 (1977); Miller, supra note 13, at 21 ("Some commentators have suggested that 
the company counsel should give Miranda-type warnings to company employees about the pur-
pose of an interview and the use of information disclosed."). 
89. See 449 U.S. at 394 n.3. 
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by corporate clients, given the stimulus provided by the risk of civil 
and criminal liability, on the ground that this argument "proves too 
much since it applies to all communications covered by the 
privilege. "90 
One reaction to Upjohn is to attack its failure to apply the utilita-
rian rationale properly. Professor Saltzburg, for instance, has criti-
cized Upjohn at length for failing to require that the employee retain 
an independent right to control waiver.91 Saltzburg's argument makes 
perfect sense: if the sole focus is on providing incentives for the "cli-
ent" to make a full disclosure to the lawyer, allowing the corporation 
an unfettered right to disclose the employee's revelations is hardly 
likely to promote revelations by the employee. 
The Supreme Court seems little impressed with this logic, how-
ever. In 1985 it held that a trustee in bankruptcy, as successor in in-
terest to a debtor corporation, has the right to waive the corporation's 
attorney-client privilege.92 Disclosure was opposed by former high of-
ficers of the corporation, who argued that allowing such a waiver 
would chill attorney-client communications by corporate officials. 
The Court was not moved: "[T]he chilling effect is no greater here 
than in the case of a solvent corporation, where individual officers and 
directors always run the risk that successor management might waive 
the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to prior man-
agement's communications with counsel."93 
In sum, if the traditional purpose does not explain privilege deci-
sions in other areas, it does not provide a workable guideline for 
waiver decisions. 
B. Problems with the Purpose Analysis 
Despite erosion of the traditional justification for the privilege, a 
purpose analysis, properly applied, might provide the key to waiver 
decisions. Indeed, purpose analysis lies close to the heart of contem-
porary legal reasoning, particularly on procedural issues, because 
90. 449 U.S. at 393 n.2. 
91. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 279, 306-08 (1984); accord Sexton, supra note 78, at 509. 
92. Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985). For a discus-
sion of the bankruptcy law issues involved, see Note, Who Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege 
in Bankruptcy?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 549 (1985). 
93. 471 U.S. at 357. A related, but different, issue arises when the corporate employee claims 
that the lawyer was acting in part as his personal counsel, which will enable him to assert the 
privilege. But the courts rarely find that such personal representation has been established as to 
high officers of the corporation, and it is even less likely to be found as to lower-level employees. 
See, e.g., United States v. Keplinger, 776 F.2d 678, 699-701 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument 
that attorney was personal representative of corporate employees). 
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courts tend to rely heavily on the purpose of a legal rule in determin-
ing whether it should be applied. A number of factors, however, make 
this solution unpromising for problems of privilege waiver. · 
First, there is little ground for expecting a new articulation of the 
privilege's purpose in the foreseeable future. As Professor Radin ob-
served nearly sixty years ago, "Bentham's denunciation [of the privi-
lege] cannot really be met as long as we keep on the level from which 
Bentham views the subject."94 Recently, commentators unsatisfied 
with the traditional utilitarian theory have attempted to articulate a 
broader basis by emphasizing the importance of the attorney-client re-
lation to personal autonomy, particularly in a world of pervasive legal 
regulation.95 Viewed in this light, the privilege protects important pri-
vacy interests,96 but this privacy rationale has been questioned.97 
Although it referred to the impact of pervasive legal regulation,98 the 
Upjohn Court did not articulate a new rationale for the privilege. 
Some insight may be provided, .however, by its invocation of Hickman 
v. Taylor, the seminal work product case,99 suggesting that the Court 
is blending attorney-client and work product ideas. 
In theory, work product, which is directed toward the lawyer's in-
centives, is totally different from the attorney-client privilege.100 In 
Hickman, the Court was careful to avoid calling the new protection 
from disclosure it was creating a privilege, a semantic battle carried on 
to this day by many. 101 But since Hickman erected an immunity to 
94. Radin, supra note 53, at 491 (footnote omitted). 
95. See id. at 492 ("The real fact is that, whether we admit it or not, the Roman and the 
medieval attitudes are verj much in our bones. We, too, think that the relationships based on 
mutual fidelity are valuable constituents of our society .... "). The best-known exponent of this 
view of the lawyer's role is Charles Fried. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Founda-
tions of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1074 (1976) ("The lawyer acts morally 
because he helps preserve and express the autonomy of his client vis-a-vis the legal system."). 
But see Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J; 631, 
640 (Fried's view a "dubious definition of friendship"). 
96. See, e.g., K.rattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 86-92 (1973); Louisell, supra note 74, at 
110-12. 
97. See Sterk, Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 
MINN. L. REV. 461, 471-72 (1977) ("The privacy basis for the attorney-client privilege ... is 
quite weak."); McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 77, at 186 ("the ultimate strategic 
significance of evidentiary privilege as a bastion for defending privacy values may be doubted"). 
98. See 449 U.S. at 392 (referring to "the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation 
confronting the modeni corporation"). 
99. See text accompanying note 86 supra. 
100. E.g., Special Project, supra note 50, at 882 (policies "fundamentally different"). 
101. E.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 599 n.10 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., 
dissenting) (Supreme Court "assiduous" in terming work product "doctrine," not "privilege"); 
Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine.· Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 943 (1983). 
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discovery it is difficult to generate much enthusiasm for this dispute, 102 
and the lower courts today routinely refer to work product as a privi-
lege.103 Upjohn 's seeming blending of the two, while theoretically un-
tidy, is not surprising. Thus Professor Cleary, the Reporter for the 
Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, ar-
gued that "preserving effective participation by the lawyer in the 
processes of litigation," the basis of the decision in Hickman, "is ex-
actly the [purpose] found for the attorney-client privilege."104 Indeed, 
work product seems critical to building client trust; surely the client 
would lose confidence in his lawyer if the lawyer's work were routinely 
available to assist the other side.105 Blending the two privileges also 
reflects reality, because a great deal of potentially discoverable mate-
rial falls within both. As a functional matter, then, what the Court 
may be doing is ensuring a zone of silence for effective and ethical 
preparation of cases. But the Court simultaneously adheres outwardly 
to the traditional utilitarian justification for the attorney-client privi-
lege, 106 so it is unlikely that it will announce a new thesis. Without 
that, the purpose analysis cannot work. 
Second, coupled with the courts' animosity toward privileges, a 
purpose analysis seems to invite overly literal application. We have 
already seen that some use this approach as a justification for parsing 
attorney-client communications, excluding all that would be made ab-
sent the privilege.107 In the waiver area, the point is illustrated by 
cases that treat the attorney-client and work product privileges differ-
ently. Work product, these courts reason, is designed only to protect 
against disclosure to opponents, so that revelation to a person who is 
not an opponent is not a waiver. 108 The attorney-client privilege, by 
way of contrast, is supposed to protect the sanctity of the relationship 
between lawyer and client; any revelation supposedly destroys its 
102. See Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks, 14 VAND. L. REV. 865, 866 (1961) (In Hickman, the 
Court was "saving face by refusing to admit that a contingency had arisen which the rules had 
not foreseen .... "). Indeed, in FrC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25 (1983), the Court itself 
referred to "the work product privilege." 
103. E.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 294, 295 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 
1985); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
104. Cleary, supra note 102, at 866-67; Developments, supra note 6, at 1647 n.84 (criticizing 
view that purpose of attorney-client privilege is limited to preserving confidentiality, because it 
"overlooks the role of the privilege in protecting the adversarial character of the judicial 
system"). 
105. See United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 521 (D. Colo. 1963) (work product "the 
result of a basic professional relationship between the lawyer and the party •.• or the essential 
integrity implicit in the lawyer-client relationship"). 
106. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
107. See note 78 supra and accompanying text. 
108. E.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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value. 109 
This view is too rigid. For the privilege-holder, the value of the 
attorney-client privilege, like work product, is that it provides a means 
of keeping hurtful information out of the hands of opponents. Ac-
cordingly, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence exempted dis-
closures from waiver if they are themselves privileged.110 The 
exception makes sense in that the dual-privilege holder can, by invok-
ing the applicable privilege, prevent his confidant from revealing the 
privileged material. Thus, the client who confidentially tells his spouse 
about what transpired in his meeting with the lawyer can contain the 
information by invoking the spousal privilege to prevent the spouse 
from revealing it. But this explanation fails to take account of the fact 
that the attorney-client privilege has, under the strict view, lost its 
value because of revelation to another. The reality is certainly that 
disclosure to a spouse or other confidant does not destroy the value of 
the privilege. Moreover, the proposed approach under the Federal 
Rules leads to absurd results. Thus, if the client told his child or 
brother or father there would be a waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege even though his decision to confide in this relative hardly suggests 
indifference to confidentiality vis-a-vis the general public. 111 Courts 
and commentators have gotten carried away with overly literal use of 
the purpose analysis. 
Other purposes can also succumb to overly literal application. If 
this article is correct in suggesting that the Supreme Court is blending 
the attorney-client and work product purposes, attention should shift 
toward the purpose of the latter. But the traditional justification for 
work product - assuring the lawyer a zone of privacy in order to 
avoid deterring preparation of the case - can be narrowed by the 
same process. As with the traditional purpose of the attorney-client 
privilege, 112 there is little empirical evidence that work product protec-
tion actually influences lawyer behavior. To the contrary, as the Court 
pointed out in Upjohn, the lawyer has an ethical duty to investigate 
fully. 113 Moreover, the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure require the lawyer to investigate before taking a posi-
109. The leading proponent of this view is the District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); accord United States v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 295-96 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1985). 
110. See proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1972) (not enacted). 
111. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Disclosure, supra note 6, at 935 (rejecting argument that after 
initial disclosure client has no further interest in privilege); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra 
note 6, at 608-10 (same). 
112. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text. 
113. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. 
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tion in litigation.114 Accordingly, one could easily argue that work 
product protection is unnecessary to accomplish this purpose of the 
privilege in many instances where it is now recognized. 115 
The point can be illustrated with the very issue before the Court in 
Upjohn. Even though lawyers confronted a "Hobson's choice" in de-
ciding whether to interview lower-level employees under the "control 
group" test, 116 there is reason to believe that they nevertheless did so 
even before that test was rejected by the Court. 117 Moreover, after 
Upjohn there remained the risk that material that would nevertheless 
be protected under its reasoning would be discoverable under more 
restrictive state law, 118 even in federal court. 119 A strict purpose anal-
ysis could preclude application of the privilege in such circumstances. 
This same approach could carry over into the waiver area; contrary to 
the present view that disclosure of work product to allies is not a 
waiver, 120 any disclosure could be treated as a waiver because today's 
allies could easily turn into tomorrow's opponents. A shift in purpose 
would not, therefore, prevent the overly literal application of the pur-
pose analysis. 
Finally, the traditional purpose analysis takes no account of the 
costs that result from the very broad waiver doctrine it invites. In-
stead, it is a device to reduce to a minimum the perceived costs of 
having privileges at all. As we have seen, however, for those who do 
not take such a one-dimensional view it is not so easy to strike the 
balance between costs of privileges and costs of broad waiver rules. 
Courts inclined to consider other factors thus have minimized the 
114. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (pleading, motion, or other paper); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(g) (re-
quest for discovery or response or objection thereto). See generally Marcus, Reducing Court 
Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364-65 (1983). 
115. Cf Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carry-Over Immunity: An Assess-
ment of Their Justifications, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 675, 683 (1986) ("A closer look at the specific 
rationales, however, suggests that the work product immunity is largely designed to protect law-
yers from themselves and their own unprofessionalism, rather than from their adversaries."). 
116. See text accompanying note 84 supra. 
117. See Barnett, Barnette, Leary & Delone, Practical Aspects of Internal A11titr11st Im•estiga· 
tions in Light of the Upjohn Decision, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 133 (1982) ("Even lawyers in 
jurisdictions which followed the severely limited 'control group' test had to pretty well ignore it 
because they could not otherwise serve their clients. It has never made sense to remain deliber· 
ately ignorant of the facts because of a fear of adverse discovery."). 
118. E.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 432 N.E.2d 250 (1982) 
(retaining control group test); see Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: 
The Intersection of Federal and Illinois Law, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 175. 
119. Under FED. R. Evm. 501, in civil cases where state law supplies the rule of decision, 
state law of privilege applies in federal court. 
120. See text accompanying notes 173-74 infra. 
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costs of broad waiver rules by entering orders preserving privilege.121 
But the traditional view offers no room for such pragmatic incursions 
on the idea that any disclosure results in a waiver. To accommodate 
such concerns, the focus should tum from purposes of the privilege to 
purposes for waiver - to protect against unfairness. 
IV. FAIRNESS 
If neither intention nor the purposes of the privileges provides a 
key to the waiver riddle, some other factor must explain decisions to 
take away privilege protection. The courts that have done more than 
state conclusions about waiver repeatedly intone fairness as the guide; 
where the circumstances of the case make it unfair to maintain privi-
lege protection the court will abrogate it. But fairness is an even more 
plastic term than waiver; from the perspective of an opponent the 
existence of a privilege may itself seem unfair if it forecloses access to 
critical evidence. This unfairness is the spectre that has caused Ameri-
can courts to take a hard line on privilege issues. Once the decision 
has been made to apply privilege protection, however, the social utility 
of the privilege has presumably been found sufficient to outweigh this 
unfairness to the opponent. 
For waiver purposes, then, the focus should be on the unfairness 
that results from the privilege-holder's affirmative act misusing the 
privilege in some way. As Learned Hand put it with regard to the fifth 
amendment, "the privilege is to suppress the truth, but that does not 
mean that it is a privilege to garble it; ... it should not furnish one side 
with what may be false evidence and deprive the other of the means of 
detecting the imposition."122 Thus, in its seminal case about the scope 
of a waiver of the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court cited the risk 
that, unless the decision to discuss a certain subject caused a waiver 
with respect to that entire subject, the privileged material could be 
used to distort the facts. 123 Similarly with the attorney-client privi-
lege, the courts have condemned "selective disclosure," in which the 
privilege-holder picks and chooses parts of privileged items, disclosing 
the favorable but withholding the unfavorable. 124 It is the truth-gar-
121. See text accompanying notes 30-3S supra. 
122. United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. dismissed as moot, 319 
U.S. 41 (1943). For an argument that the truth·distortion analysis should not be applied to the 
fifth amendment, see Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 17S2, 1764-68 (1979). 
123. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (19Sl). 
124. This idea has been recognized for over a century. Thus, in Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 26 F. SS (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 188S), plaintiff offered in evidence parts of its 
communications with counsel and the court found a waiver because plaintiff "sought to use them 
1628 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1605 
bling risk that results from such affirmative but selective use of privi-
leged material, rather than the mere fact of disclosure, that justifies 
treating such revelations as waivers. Accordingly, even where they feel 
impelled by the traditional view to treat an inoffensive disclosure as a 
waiver, courts will often narrow the scope of the waiver to avoid an 
unbounded intrusion into otherwise privileged matters. 125 
Although the focus on unfairness resulting from the further act on 
which the waiver is predicated seems correct, there remains substan-
tial overlap with the underlying sense of unfairness flowing from the 
existence of the privilege in the first place. Complete inactivity by the 
privilege-holder might lead to the wrong result owing to absence of the 
privileged material. Can that possibility be disregarded in evaluating 
any actions the privilege-holder does take? In actual cases, waiver is-
sues arise in specific contexts. To apply the various grounds for 
waiver, then, we must examine these specific litigation contexts. 
A. Putting in Issue 
Many decisions are made only after counsel has been consulted 
regarding the legal ramifications of alternate courses of conduct. Once 
the decision is made, litigation may ensue. If it does, it may be impor-
tant to determine how the actors perceived their legal rights or obliga-
tions when they made the decision in issue. Obviously, the legal 
advice they received would be significant evidence should the court 
find a waiver, a question that usually turns on whether the privilege-
holder has put the matter "in issue." 
The truth-garbling concern readily supports finding a waiver when 
a party affirmatively relies on privileged material. For example, if the 
defendant's president testifies that he terminated the contract with the 
plaintiff on advice of counsel, there will be a waiver as to all advice he 
received on that subject, 126 whether from current counsel or other at-
as a weapon against defendant." 26 F. at 56. The court reasoned that a party may not "remove 
the seal of secrecy from so much of the privileged communication as makes for his advantage, 
and insist that it shall not be removed as to so much as makes to the advantage of his adversary." 
26 F. at 57. This is, of course, the central concern in defining the scope of waiver, which reaches 
all communications on the same subject matter. For similar reasoning with respect to work 
product, see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), in which the court found a waiver due 
to "testimonial use" of work product. 422 U.S. at 239 & n.14. 
125. E.g., Champion Intl. Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (N.D. 
Ga. 1980) (refusal to find that disclosure of"a very slight amount of privileged material" justifies 
"waiver of a large amount of other privileged material"); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 
F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (narrow reading of waiver to promote fairness); IBM v. Sperry 
Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968) (narrow reading of waiver fosters free disclosure 
while protecting against misuse of privilege to distort or mislead). 
126. E.g., Smith v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 538 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D. Del. 1982), ajfd. 
mem., 758 F.2d 668 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2142 (1985); Perrignon v. Bergen 
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tomeys. 127 Only with access to this information can the opponent neu-
tralize the risk that revelation of part of the lawyer's advice creates a 
misimpression about what the lawyer really said. Accordingly, courts 
often require parties to commit in advance on whether they will rely 
on privileged material at trial, thereby enabling the opponent to ex-
plore the entire spectrum of advice through discovery. 128 
Were this waiver ground limited to such situations, it would pres-
ent few difficulties. However, courts frequently premise a waiver on 
the decision of the privilege-holder to raise certain legal or factual is-
sues. Thus, when a defendant in a civil rights action raised a defense 
of qualified immunity, the court held that he had waived the attomey-
client privilege with respect to any advice he received about the legal-
ity of the procedures in issue.129 Similarly, when Exxon Corporation 
defended its pricing practices against claims of overcharges, it was 
held to have waived the privilege by asserting in defense that it had 
adopted these practices in reliance on Department of Energy interpre-
tations of prevailing regulations. 130 An employment discrimination 
plaintiff who sought to avoid the running of the statute of limitations 
by relying on the equitable tolling doctrine that excuses delays induced 
by the prospective defendant's settlement overtures was held to have 
waived the privilege as to communications with his lawyer that might 
indicate that he had deferred suing for reasons other than settlement 
possibilities.131 Perhaps most remarkably, in a suit to reform a con-
tract on grounds of mutual mistake, the court used this waiver doc-
trine to require the party seeking reformation to reveal all 
contemporaneous communications with its lawyer about the 
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Garfinkle v. Arcata Natl. Corp., 64 
F.R.D. 688, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Lee Natl. Corp. v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Del. 
1970). 
127. Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 731, 732 (N.D. III. 1974) 
("If the rule were limited to only a particular counsel, a party might get several viewpoints and 
assert reliance on only one, thus barring an inquiry as to the actuality and reasonableness of that 
reliance."). Assuming that the key question is the president's state of mind at the time he termi-
nated the contract, this reasoning obviously does not apply to advice he received thereafter. 
128. E.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 
1976); International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1973); 
Fautek v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 420, 421 (N.D. III. 1980) 
(court orders discovery of computerized personnel records prepared as foundation for expert 
testimony). But cf. American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 432 (D. Mass. 
1972) (court refuses to find waiver because assertions in affidavits dealt with "pre-trial matters, 
not evidence"). 
129. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
130. United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 246 (D.D.C. 1981). 
131. Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 456, 458 (S.D. Tex. 1980); 
accord Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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agreement. 132 
To the extent these decisions rest on forecasts about the privilege-
holder•s injection of privileged material at trial, the results are consis-
tent with the truth-garbling fairness analysis. 133 In form, however, 
they involve no such prediction. Instead, they seem to tum on alloca-
tion of burdens of pleading and proof and, on that basis, to rob the 
privilege-holder of privilege protection as the price for raising a given 
legal issue even though he will not make affirmative use of privileged 
material. Thus, the courts emphasize what the privilege-holder has to 
prove, not how he is going to prove it. Ultimately this shift in focus 
perverts waiver because it rests on the unfairness of having a privilege, 
rather than the unfairness of the act relied upon, to show a waiver. 134 
These difficulties are compounded by the courts' tendency to stress 
the allocation of burdens of pleading and proof in deciding whether a 
party has "injected" an issue into a case. In a negative sense, stressing 
pleading burdens is logical because the privilege-holder's right to as-
sert the privilege should not tum on his opponent's decision to raise a 
certain issue. 135 But the allocation of pleading burdens does not pro-
vide a reliable affirmative guide. Although notions of fairness may 
support placing the pleading burden on the party with easiest access to 
the evidence, a variety of other factors also come into play.136 For 
example, when the Supreme Court held qualified privilege to be an 
affirmative defense in civil rights cases so that defendants have the bur-
den of pleading good faith, it relied mainly on the remedial objectives 
of the civil rights acts and cited access to proof only as a secondary 
132. Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 
133. E.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674, 679-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(plaintiff must rely on given document to establish element of case). 
134. For a similar conclusion, see Developments, supra note 6, at 1641-43. See also Standard 
Chartered Bank v. Ayala Intl. Holdings, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986): 
If SCB's position were correct, the privilege would be a nullity in all the vast commercial 
litigation in which fraud or reliance is an issue. Whenever parties entered into a transaction, 
they would have to restrain themselves from free and frank communications with their at-
torneys in the realization that all their confidences would be revealed if litigation on the 
transaction were ever to ensue. 
135. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 
1206, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("It cannot be possible for Anderson to justify breaching Chase's 
privilege by reason of its own pleading of an affirmative defense.'') (emphasis omitted). But see 
AM Intl., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 311 (N.D. Ill. 1982), in 
which defendant responded to a suit for patent infringement with a counterclaim alleging the suit 
was brought in bad faith. Defendant then sought production of work product showing plaintiff's 
assessment of the validity of the patent on which plaintiff sued. The court found that defendant 
was entitled to access because "the opinions of [plaintiff's] attorneys as to the merits of the 
action" were "[d]irectly at issue.'' 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 313. 
136. See generally Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 
STAN. L. R.Ev. 5, 11-14 (1959) (discussing factors to be considered in allocating burdens of plead-
ing and proof). 
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consideration.137 Since the "putting in issue" form of waiver ordinarily 
involves the privilege-holder's state of mind, fairness would always 
point toward imposing the pleading burden on him. Obviously that 
does not happen; the fact that a securities fraud plaintiff must plead 
and prove that defendant acted with scienter138 is but one of many 
examples in which plaintiff must plead and prove defendant's state of 
mind. Different fairness factors may apply to pleading and waiver de-
cisions, but the central point is that fairness does not regularly control 
the allocation of pleading burdens, so that allocation should not be the 
determinative matter on waiver. Indeed, the party who bears the bur-
den of pleading and proving his opponent's state of mind has a 
stronger argument for access because he has a greater need to develop 
evidence on that subject. 
The heart of the courts' attitude seems to be that in some litigation 
contexts the existence of the privilege is too unfair. Thus, when the 
court stripped Exxon of the privilege in its overcharge case as the price 
for relying on its understanding of Department of Energy regula-
tions, 139 it explained that "[t]here is no other reasonable way for plain-
tiff to explore Exxon's corporate state of mind, a consideration now 
central to this suit."140 The concern that, as to certain issues in certain 
cases, the existence of a privilege hampers the opponent too much is a 
legitimate one that can affect substantive decisions. Thus, in uphold-
ing its rule that the defendant in a defamation case has the burden of 
proving truth, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited that state's 
shield law, which enables the media to refuse to disclose sources, 141 as 
a reason for placing the burden on defendant, 142 although the United 
States Supreme Court recently found that the first amendment forbids 
137. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1980) (stressing policy objective of construing 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 generously); 446 U.S. at 640-41 (pointing out that immunity depends on facts 
peculiarly within defendant's knowledge). 
138. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
139. See note 130 supra and accompanying text. 
140. United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 246, 249 (D.D.C. 1981). Developments, supra 
note 6, at 1642, labels the court's result "outrageous." This outcome is hardly unique, however. 
For other examples, see Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 456, 458 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980) (privilege breached because "[i]t is essential to proper resolution of the equitable 
tolling issue to know when the plaintiffs learned of the 180-day requirement"); Pitney-Bowes, 
Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 447 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (privilege abridged because it "would have 
served to eliminate the one source of evidence likely to contradict [privilege-holder's] 
allegations"). 
141. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (1982). 
142. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 327-28, 485 A.2d 374, 386-87 
(1984) ("[T]his additional protection to a media defendant and the resulting impediment imposed 
upon the plaintiff in seeking to establish the falsity of the statements provides a further justifica-
tion for maintaining our current practice of requiring the defendant to prove truth in defense of 
such a suit."), revd., 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). 
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such a burden shift. 143 Similar adjustments of pleading burdens or 
standards of proof in other areas might redress unfair advantage re-
sulting from the existence of privileges. Removal of privilege protec-
tion might also serve this goal. In some states, for example, the 
doctor-patient privilege is inapplicable in any case where the patient's 
condition is in issue, whether or not that issue was raised by the 
patient.144 
Whatever the future of such solutions to the problem of perceived 
unfairness created by the existence of the attorney-client privilege, 145 
distorting waiver analysis is not a promising solution.146 The waiver 
decisions abandon the underlying principle of fairness because they do 
not focus on unfairness resulting from the act giving rise to the 
waiver. 147 At the same time they fail to distinguish between cases 
143. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). The five-Justice major-
ity was "unconvinced that the State's shield law requires a different constitutional standard than 
would prevail in the absence of such a law." 106 S. Ct. at 1565. It is worth noting that the Court 
has refused to find that the first amendment affords newspaper reporters a privilege akin to the 
one provided by the Pennsylvania shield law. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
144. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-802(4) (1985). 
145. See text accompanying notes 237-57 infra for an examination of the implications of the 
fairness analysis on the "absolute" protection of the privilege. 
146. One method of minimizing unwarranted incursions into the attorney-client privilege 
would be to shift focus again to the purposes of the privilege. With the doctor-patient privilege, 
for example, it is accepted that where a personal-injury plaintiff places his physical condition in 
issue he waives that privilege. See, e.g., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 103, at 254. 
This waiver is based in part on fairness. See Collins v. Bair, 256 Ind. 230, 240, 268 N.E.2d 951 
100 (1971) (patient would not be allowed to "stack the deck" and use the privilege to "misrepre· 
sent the precise origin of the injury with impunity"); Awtry v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 399, 401 
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (impairment of defendant's ability to prepare a defense a factor in decision to 
find a waiver); cf Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 119 (1964) (where plaintiff places his 
physical condition in issue, good cause for a physical examination is obvious from the pleadings). 
But the waiver is principally based on a purpose analysis. By calling attention to his physical 
condition, courts reason, plaintiff has nullified the value of a privilege designed principally to 
keep such facts secret. See, e.g., McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. 1968). This ap-
proach is not helpful with the attorney-client privilege, however. Where the privilege-holder 
does not rely on the content of his communications with his lawyer (invoking the truth-garbling 
fairness concern), there is no act inconsistent with the privilege. But cf Jack Winter, Inc. v. 
Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 229 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (relying on handling of doctor-patient privi-
lege to find waiver of attorney-client privilege). 
147. It might be argued that there is a connection between the fairness concerns and the 
triggering events because the privilege-holder is likely to testify about this subject, thereby raising 
truth-garbling concerns unless access to privileged material follows. This argument is not per-
suasive because it could apply to any litigant who offers evidence on an issue while simultane-
ously invoking the privilege. The "truth-suppressing" role of the privilege, see text 
accompanying note 122 supra, involves, in large part, denying the opponent access to this im-
peaching material. 
In this vein, it is worth noting that the opponent is not entirely unprotected against perjury. 
The lawyer's obligation not to assist the client in committing perjury applies to all information he 
has received from the client. The Supreme Court has recently held that this duty authorizes even 
appointed counsel for a criminal defendant to threaten to breach confidentiality and testify for 
the prosecution, in order to deter his client from perjuring himself, if he reasonably believes the 
client intends to do so. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
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seemingly involving comparable fairness implications, due to the hap-
penstance of pleading burdens. Instead, this waiver doctrine should be 
limited to cases in which the privilege-holder injects the privileged ma-
terial itself into the case. 
B. Revelation to Opponent 
Very different considerations arise when waiver is predicated on 
pretrial disclosure, particularly "inadvertent waiver," a frequent oc-
currence due to the breadth of modern discovery. We have seen the 
high costs that efforts to avoid such a waiver can generate.148 Owing 
to the natural inclination not to turn over that which may be withheld, 
some efforts to withhold privileged material would be likely whether 
or not there was a waiver risk. The waiver question is whether the 
failure of such a screening effort forever deprives the privilege-holder 
of the privilege. 
A starting point in the analysis is to recognize that the troubling 
discovery waiver issue does not arise in situations in which the privi-
lege-holder himself affirmatively relies on the privileged material, be-
cause by doing so he puts it in issue - thereby creating a situation 
that precisely raises the truth-garbling concern.149 But even in such 
circumstances, other litigation concerns may counsel caution. For ex-
ample, in settlement discussions lawyers may reveal privileged infor-
mation either to demonstrate candor or to show the weakness of the 
opponent's position. Where there is some prospect that the privilege-
holder will decide to use the material at trial (should settlement not 
occur), there is at least as strong an argument for finding a waiver as in 
cases where the court insists on a pretrial commitment on whether the 
privilege will be waived at trial. 150 Some courts have been hesitant to 
take this step, however, because they are concerned that the risk of 
waiver will impede settlement negotiations by making the parties 
overly circumspect.151 To the extent there would be a waiver at trial 
absent settlement, this attitude is of doubtful wisdom because it disre-
gards the truth-garbling problem, and other courts treat settlement 
148. See Part I supra. 
149. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra. 
150. See note 128 supra and accompanying text. 
151. E.g., Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974) (waiver limited 
to matters disclosed); American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 426, 431 (D. Mass. 
1972) ("Clients and lawyers should not have to fear that positions on legal issues taken during 
negotiations waive the attorney-client privilege so that private opinions and reports drafted by an 
attorney for his'client become discoverable."); Note, Attorney Disclosure, supra note 6, at 942 
(same). 
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disclosure as waiver.152 The fact that this result does not follow auto-
matically shows, however, that the courts will weigh genuine fairness 
concerns against other factors in making waiver decisions. 
Against this background, the "inadvertent waiver" situation 
presents much simpler problems. Almost by definition, these are not 
materials that the privilege-holder will offer in evidence. 153 Ordinarily 
they hurt his position, and were turned over to his opponent only be-
cause of some slip-up in the discovery screening process. Intention is 
hardly a ground for finding a waiver here because there was probably 
not only no intention to waive, but not even an intention to deliver the 
materials to the opponent. Fairness similarly fails to support a finding 
of waiver. Since the question is whether the slip-up will create a wind-
fall of access to privileged material, fairness cuts, if anything, against 
waiver. Many courts therefore treat the inadvertent delivery of privi-
leged material as no waiver.154 Indeed, as indicated above, some even 
enshrine this commitment in pretrial orders purporting to sanitize in-
advertent revelations.155 
In many other quarters, however, a harsher nineteenth-century at-
titude prevails. Harking back to the Wigmorian view that any disclo-
sure destroys the privilege, these courts regularly find waivers where 
the disclosure was clearly an attorney's mistake. 156 Indeed, in Trans-
america Computer Co. v. IBM 157 the Ninth Circuit escaped this prece-
152. E.g., Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981); R.J. Hereley & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1980). A better ap· 
proach might be to require a pretrial election whether to waive at trial. See text accompanying 
note 128 supra. 
153. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1664 ("[I]nadvertent disclosures create a waiver issue 
only when the material is favorable to the privilege-holder's adversary: if the matter were unfa· 
vorable to him, he would not seek to place it in evidence."). Owing to the risk that opponent B 
will claim that waiver results from inadvertent production to opponent A, it is important to keep 
in mind the fact that the privileged material may not be harmful vis-a-vis A, and thus that, but 
for the risk of waiver to the world, it would be quite understandable that only limited efforts 
would be made to cull it out. See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra. 
154. E.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); New York State Energy Research & Dev. Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., 
36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1511, 1518-19 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing to find waiver as to 
"peek-a-boo documents" briefly shown to adversary); Mendenhall v. "9arber-Greene Co., 531 F. 
Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975·2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
60,561, at 67,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Special Project, supra note 50, at 888 n.790 ("[N)o waiver 
occurs if the disclosure is made inadvertently; disclosure must be made knowingly."). 
155. See text accompanying notes 30-35 supra. 
156. E.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 
n.13 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[W]hen, as here, the privileged communication is voluntarily disclosed 
without objection by the asserting party's counsel .•• it may be unnecessary to look beyond the 
objective fact of disclosure .•.. "); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. 
Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970). Contra Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 
(N.D. Ill. 1980). 
157. 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978); see text accompanying notes 22-27 & 31-32 supra. 
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dent only by emphasizing the extraordinary pressures under which 
IBM was operating and the "herculean" measures it employed to cope 
with those pressures. The court was therefore able to pass off IBM's 
slip-up as tantamount to erroneously compelled production of privi-
leged materials. 158 But the judge had never ordered IBM to produce 
privileged materials. To the contrary, his order preserving privilege 
despite inadvertent disclosure showed he had no such intention. How-
ever extraordinary the circumstances in Transamerica, they merely il-
lustrate in macrocosm the type of problems that parties confront 
regularly in microcosm. 
The real question, then, is why the Wigmorian attitude should be 
indulged at all. Courts and commentators who recoil from 
Wigmorian rigidity tend to urge instead some sort of negligence or 
reasonable efforts standard.159 Given the natural incentive of litigants 
not to turn over that which they can withhold, however, there seems 
to be little reason for the courts to scrutinize the adequacy of their 
efforts in deciding whether to inflict the additional consequences of 
waiver on them, particularly in view of the various costs that attend 
this course. At least theoretically, then, waiver through discovery 
should be limited to those situations in which the privilege-holder 
seeks to use the material affirmatively, raising the truth-garbling 
concern.160 
This solution fails to deal with the problem created by the fact the 
opposing party now has the privileged material. Can the rabbit be 
stuffed back into the hat? Where a party steals privileged material a 
court may, in effect, "suppress" it, as with illegally seized evidence in 
criminal cases. 161 In inadvertent disclosure cases, courts that enter 
privilege-preservation orders sometimes provide that privileged mater-
158. See 573 F.2d at 650-52. 
159. E.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure"); 
Note, Inadvertent Disclosure, supra note 6, at 616-19. 
160. For an example, see First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160 (E.D. 
Wis. 1980), in which the court found that defendants had gained no advantage through disclo-
sure of 32 privileged documents among 150,000 pages of material produced, and that fairness 
therefore did not mandate a waiver. 86 F.R.D. at 174; accord SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 
F.R.D. 508, 519 (D. Conn.), appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976). 
161. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. III. 
1981), in which the court declined to order stolen privileged information returned, ruling that the 
privilege had been lost because it had not been maintained in confidence. The court appeared to 
assume it could order return of genuinely privileged material. For an example of a court taking 
action regarding wrongfully obtained material in a civil case, see EEOC v. United Assn. of Jour-
neyman & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local 189, 3ll F. Supp. 464 (S.D. 
Ohio 1970) (court suppresses statements taken from black workers through coercion outside 
discovery process). 
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ials be returned once identified as such.162 Similar measures could be 
used generally; inadvertently produced materials could be held un-
available as evidence to the opposing party, although the memory of 
their contents cannot be erased. While incomplete, these measures do 
remove some of the sting resulting from the mistake. But they proba-
bly should not be employed for two reasons. First, if unintended de-
livery of privileged material could always be taken back, even the 
normal incentive to screen out such material would be withdrawn, and 
there could be continual uncertainty about whether privilege would 
actually be asserted as to items produced in discovery, a prospect that 
could disrupt trial preparation. 
Second, and more significant, this "now you see it, now you don't" 
approach creates a risk of undermining the appearance of justice. To 
take a simple example, suppose the item in question is a letter from the 
defendant to his lawyer that says, "The light was red," and defendant 
testifies at trial that the light was green. Putting aside ethical con-
straints on defendant's lawyer, 163 the truth-suppressing consequence 
of the privilege164 would effectively deprive plaintiff of this contradic-
tory evidence. That cost is different, however, from the cost that 
would result had defendant inadvertently produced the letter and later 
asked that it be suppressed. Then plaintiff would know of the exis-
tence of the contradictory evidence but still be unable to use it, a result 
that not only suppresses the truth but threatens to make justice a 
mockery.165 That cost may be justified where the privileged material 
is stolen, but not where the opposing party received it innocently. 
It is a far different matter, however, to treat the inadvertent disclo-
sure as a waiver with respect to other material that was not turned 
over. Although the inadvertent disclosure works something of a wind-
fall by giving the opponent materials he would not otherwise have, 
there is no need to take the much greater step and treat it as a 
waiver. 166 It is simply an inadvertent disclosure of evidence that could 
162. See Mills v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., Nos. 78 C 4277 & 79 C 134 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 
1985) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (inadvertently produced privileged material 
"shall be immediately returned to the producing party"). 
163. Cf Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (attorney for criminal defendant can 
threaten to testify against him if he gives perjured testimony at trial). 
164. See text accompanying note 122 supra. 
165. See text accompanying notes 196-97 infra. 
166. For an analogous approach in the settlement negotiations situation, see Burlington In-
dus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 46 (D. Md. 1974), in which the court held that disclosure 
worked a waiver but limited the waiver to the matters disclosed. Owing to the possibility that 
this material will be used affirmatively, see text accompanying notes 150-52 supra, this handling 
is questionable. 
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have been held back.167 
To make the point clear, consider the next step in the argument -
that if inadvertent disclosure to A waives the privilege as to him, it also 
waives as to B, C: D, etc. As to them, one does not confront the 
threshold reality that by the time the issue arises they already possess 
the inadvertently revealed material. Is each of them nevertheless auto-
matically entitled to receive the inadvertently produced material be-
cause A got it? They might well get it if A were to introduce it into 
evidence at trial. 168 But most cases are settled, like CDC's suit against 
IBM, so that discovery results may never become part of the public 
record. 169 Moreover, A may agree to return the material as part of the 
settlement package, giving him an additional pawn to play in the set-
tlement negotiation.170 But if the inadvertent delivery could not be 
taken back, B, C: and D would get a windfall and A would lose the 
opportunity to bargain away his good fortune in receiving the errone-
ously produced materials. The appropriate reaction should mirror the 
view of the Supreme Court in Upjohn that the disclosure "puts the 
adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never 
taken place."171 
In sum, although the fact that A has the materials does complicate 
the situation, it does not mean that inadvertent production must be 
treated as a waiver. · 
C. Information Sharing 
The litigant who avoids improvident delivery of privileged material 
to his opponent may nevertheless decide to reveal it to somebody else. 
He may have various reasons for wishing to do so. Most understand-
able as a matter of strategy is the frequent need for co-parties to share 
167. Waiver may result, however, if the privilege-holder tries to defuse this evidence by in-
jecting more privileged material into the gap to explain away the evidence. That affirmative use 
of the material would trigger the truth-garbling concern. See text accompanying notes 126-28 
supra. 
168. Ordinarily the use of confidential information as evidence at trial makes it a part of the 
record and presumptively available to the public. See National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1981) (litigant markets trade secrets of opponent after they 
were introduced in evidence at trial). 
169. Even where such materials are not in evidence, there may be a public right of access to 
them because they have been involved in pretrial rulings. Thus, in finding a waiver argument one 
court reasoned that "[o]nce the document was produced for inspection, it entered the public 
domain." Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 
1970). For a criticism of this "public access" attitude, see Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protec-
tive Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 46-49 (1983). 
170. See Marcus, supra note 169, at 27-28. 
171. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). 
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information with each other in aid of the common litigation effort. 172 
One step removed is the desire to share information with a nonparty, 
particularly the government, which may provide some assistance. Be-
yond that, information-sharing may serve a litigant's emotional needs. 
Litigation can be a lonely, confusing experience, and it may often be 
helpful to have some confidant other than the lawyer. 
Traditionally the courts have taken a narrow view of the circle of 
persons with whom such sharing is possible free of waiver. Sharing 
with co-parties has long been immunized against waiver, 173 as has 
sharing with nonparties who have a common foe, 174 and courts are 
fairly free in finding common interests sufficient to avoid a waiver. 175 
But disclosure to a close relative or other confidant can be expected to 
result in a waiver176 unless this further communication is itself privi-
leged, such as a communication to a spouse or psychotherapist.177 
The most striking impact of this narrow view, however, comes 
with accountants and auditors, not relatives. For publicly held com-
panies, receiving a clean bill of health from an auditor or accountant 
may be essential to continued acceptance of the company's securities 
in financial markets. 178 But this professional may insist on access to 
privileged matters as part of a complete examination of the company's 
financial condition. Under these circumstances, the company's acqui-
escence can only in the loosest sense be labeled "voluntary." In tum-
172. See McSweeney & Brody, Defending the Multi-Party Civil Conspiracy Case, LITIGA· 
TION, Spring 1986, at 8, 8 ("[I]fknowledge is power in litigation, then shared knowledge is power 
multiplied."). Such strategic sharing is not limited to co-defendants. See Kirsch, Evidence-
Sharing, CAL. LAW., June 1985, at 19 (describing sharing of information between plaintiffs' 
attorneys). 
173. E.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964); /11 re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 392-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
In Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977), the 
court held that where attorney for one co-defendant in an antitrust case had attended joint de-
fense meetings, he could be subject to disqualification at the request of another defendant on the 
ground that defendant had revealed confidences at the meetings. But cf. Fred Weber, Inc. v. 
Shell Oil Co., 432 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo.) (no disqualification where no confidential information 
actually shared), affd., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). As the 
court noted in Kaskie v. Celotex Corp., 618 F. Supp. 696, 699 (N.D. III. 1985), "Co-defendants 
and their attorneys are simply not as likely to 'bare their souls' to each other." 
174. E.g., United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 2 J. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE~ 503(b)[06], at 503-60 (Aug. 1980) ("Only 
if there is no common interest and the interests of the parties are totally antagonistic will the 
privilege be denied."); Note, Inter-Attorney Exchange, supra note 6. 
175. E.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1985) 
(information sharing among potential merger partners who later became adversaries not a 
waiver). 
176. See Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127, 145 (Del. 1982) (disclosure to friend waives 
privilege). 
177. See text accompanying note 110 supra. 
178. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1984). 
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ing over such materials, the company is hardly sharing them with the 
world. Indeed, the auditors themselves argued unsuccessfully that a 
new privilege should cover their dealings with their clients, so that 
revelation of unprivileged material would be protected.179 The pre-
vailing judicial view, however, is that the disclosure destroys the confi-
dentiality of previously privileged materials. Although this view may 
to some extent reflect the Securities Acts' policy of full disclosure, 180 
given the array of matters an auditor may investigate it could destroy 
the privilege altogether.181 
Perhaps sensing this problem, the courts fall back on a fairness 
argument that criticizes "selective disclosure" - revelation to A but 
not to B. Some courts invest this argument with a rather moral tone, 
asserting that a privilege-holder can only share information with third 
parties at "the traditional price."182 But this is not the dangerous type 
of selective disclosure unless it leads to selective use of part of the 
material as evidence, thereby raising the truth-garbling concem.183 
Otherwise, there seems to be little unfairness to B flowing from revela-
tion to A, even if A and B are adversaries.184 Indeed, the courts' will-
ingness to permit information-sharing among those who have a 
179. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). 
180. See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982), in which the company argued 
that such a disclosure was "coerced by the legal duty of due diligence and the millions of dollars 
riding on the public offering of registered securities." The court found this factor irrelevant 
because "[f]ederal securities laws put a price of disclosure upon access to interstate capital mar-
kets. Once materials are utilized in that disclosure, they become representations to third parties 
by the corporation." 675 F.2d at 489. \, 
181. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1659 n.141 ("This facially innocuous' strain of waiver 
doctrine conceals an ability to completely eviscerate the attorney-client privilege for publicly held 
corporations."). 
182. E.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chubb 
Integrated Sys. v. National Bank, 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 (D.D.C. 1984); Maryville Academy v. Loeb 
Rhoades & Co., 559 F. Supp. 7, 9 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
183. For a striking example of the confusion of these two concepts, see In re Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The materials in question had been submitted to 
the SEC as part of its "voluntary disclosure program," see note 188 infra, and private plaintiffs 
then served a subpoena on the company's lawyers for the documents. Finding that submission to 
the SEC was a "testimonial" use of the privileged materials, the district court ordered them 
turned over, 99 F.R.D. 582, 586 (D.D.C. 1983), and the court of appeals affirmed. As to the 
SEC, the truth-garbling concern surely would have justified finding a subject matter waiver. 
Whether or not the SEC was given a distorted picture, however, the company had made no 
evidentiary use whatsoever of the materials in their litigation with the private plaintiffs, and the 
same fairness concerns have no bearing. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1654-56 (criticizing 
the reasoning of this decision). 
184. See Special Project, supra note 50, at 889 ("The inherent unfairness associated with 
'testimonial use' of privileged materials that necessitates waiver of evidentiary privilege is not 
present when disclosures are made to third parties in the course of trial preparation.") (footnote 
omitted). This point is a variant of the argument made above about the fairness of treating 
inadvertent disclosure to A as a waiver vis-a-vis B, c; D, etc. See text accompanying notes 168-71 
supra. 
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common adversary185 shows that the fact that such sharing may re-
bound to the disadvantage of B (who is confronted by better-prepared 
adversaries) is not a form of unfairness that justifies finding a 
waiver.186 Surely B has less to complain about if A is not his adver-
sary, for he would then be in the same position vis-a-vis the disclosure 
as everyone else.187 Moreover, there may be substantial social benefits 
from promoting disclosure to A through a no-waiver rule, 188 and the 
"selective disclosure" objection provides no counterweight to these 
considerations. 
There are legitimate explanations for the courts' uneasiness about 
permitting such disclosures without a waiver, however. First, there is 
no easy way to handle attempts to obtain the information from the 
party to whom it was disclosed. Accordingly, some attack arguments 
that disclosure should not work a waiver as creating a "new" privi-
lege, 189 something courts abhor. If the privilege-holder can prevent 
the recipient from revealing the privileged material, this argument has 
some surface appeal since it would seemingly endow the privilege-
holder with a new right to close the mouth of the recipient, the "new" 
privilege. But the real source of privilege protection is the existing 
privilege, and the real question is whether disclosure destroys that 
protection. 
The "new" privilege argument proves too much. As part of the 
185. See notes 173-75 supra and accompanying text. 
186. In some cases courts may find disclosure to some, but not all, the parties in a case to be 
unfair. For example, in In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319, 322 (D. Del. 1969) (footnote omitted), the 
court reasoned that "[i]t would be most inequitable to hold that privileged matter can be waived 
as to one party to [a patent interference proceeding] but not to another, thus giving a superior 
advantage to one party over another." But since the objective of such sharing is to achieve such 
an advantage by pooling information, it is difficult to see why this reasoning will often apply. 
187. See text accompanying note 19 supra (describing broad impact of traditional waiver 
rules which treat waiver as effective as to the world). 
188. A well-known example is provided by the SEC's "voluntary disclosure" program, which 
was designed to encourage full disclosure to the agency. In Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 
F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1976), the court ruled that, in order to promote disclosure, delivery to the SEC 
would not be a waiver in spite of the normal waiver rules. Accord Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 
F.R.D. 679, 684-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981), the court rejected this view. The issue has generated a lively academic debate. See 
Hacker & Rotunda, Officers, Directors, and Their Professional Advisors: Rights, Duties, and Lia-
bilities, 2 CORP. L. REV. 250 (1979); Comment, supra note 78; Note, The Limited Waiver Rule: 
Creation of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, SEC-Corporation Privilege]; Note, Unjustified Severity, supra note 6. These issues are not 
limited to disclosure to the SEC, however. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1312(c)(2) (1982), preserves privilege despite delivery of material to the Antitrust Division in 
certain situations. More generally, the kinds of emotional and other factors that would tend to 
prompt privilege-holders to confide in others, see text following note 172 supra, seem equally 
worthy of respect absent countervailing fairness concerns. 
189. E.g., Note, SEC-Corporation Privilege, supra note 188; Developments, supra note 6, at 
1645-48. 
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ordinary confidentiality analysis to determine whether the privilege at-
taches, it has long been recognized that presence of other persons nec-
essary to the relationship or communication via intermediaries would 
not destroy the privilege.190 Accordingly, the privilege-holder could 
prevent these persons from revealing the privileged information with-
out running afoul of the "new" privilege problem. To a certain extent, 
this analysis can be_ applied to the joint defense situation, 191 but it is a 
poor fit for information-sharing among unrelated persons with a com-
mon adversary.192 Certainly the enforceability of privilege-preserva-
tion orders193 cannot be fit within the traditional framework. In a 
similar vein, where unprivileged confidential business information is 
revealed through discovery, the courts regularly enforce agreements to 
maintain confidentiality without worrying about "new" privileges.194 
Thus, accepted limitations on waiver themselves founder on the "new" 
privilege objection. 
The real question is how to decide whether to permit further ex-
pansion of the charmed circle with whom sharing does not work a 
waiver. The most reasonable focus is to look for an explicit or implicit 
undertaking by the recipient of the information to hold it in confi-
dence. The courts already recognize some such undertakings as en-
forceable, as the longstanding acceptance of sharing among co-parties 
shows. The order preserving privilege is similarly premised on al-
lowing the party who obtains such material through discovery to re-
fuse to turn it over to others. Such promises are not always 
forthcoming, and the courts do not enforce unilateral claims that priv-
ilege has been retained despite disclosure.195 Where there has been 
such an undertaking, however, the charge that allowing the recipient 
to refuse to turn over privileged material creates a new privilege is a 
distraction. 
The second problem presents more difficulties. At some point 
widespread circulation of privileged information threatens to make a 
mockery of justice if, due to his inability to obtain the information or 
offer it in evidence, the opponent is subjected to a judicial result that 
190. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 91. 
191. See note 173 supra and accompanying text. 
192. See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text. 
193. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text. 
194. See generally Marcus, supra note 169, at 9-11. 
195. E.g., In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Fulbright & Jaworski, 99 F.R.D. 582, 585 
(D.D.C. 1983) ("The lawyers' self-serving declaration about confidentiality was not accepted by 
the SEC .... "), ajfd., 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 
F. Supp. 771, 775 (D. Okla. 1976). 
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many others (who do have the information) know to be wrong.196 
Very strong fairness arguments then counsel disclosure, and the inter-
est in preserving the privilege diminishes to the vanishing point. This, 
indeed, seems to be a central concern of courts that condemn "selec-
tive disclosure" to some but not others. 197 
As with the "new privilege" objection, however, this concern does 
not compel an automatic finding of waiver upon disclosure to anyone, 
because explicit or implicit promises of confidentiality can assure effec-
tive containment of the information. Obviously the fact that the privi-
lege-holder confides in a close relative does not mean that the whole 
world knows as a result. Moreover, the number of cases in which the 
information is so contradictory as to hold the judicial result up to 
scorn must be limited. Although there may well be cases in which this 
public scorn problem would require abrogation of the privilege,198 that 
possibility does not mandate a uniform rule that disclosure to anyone 
works a waiver. Instead of invoking an inflexible rule, the court 
should focus on these factors in deciding whether to treat disclosure as 
destroying the privilege-holder's preexisting right to contain the 
information. 
D. Witness Preparation 
The fourth major waiver category can be labeled witness prepara-
tion, although it encompasses events beyond that precise activity. It 
has long been true that, where a witness uses a document for assist-
ance while testifying, the opposing party is allowed to examine the 
196. Cf. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Ver-
dicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1373 (1985) (arguing that hearsay rule furthers similar interests 
because, by insisting on cross-examination, it "minimizes the risk that a verdict will be undercut 
by ensuring that the declarant cannot easily recant his statement"). For a criticism of Professor 
Nesson's article, see Park, The Hearsay Rule and the Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Profes-
sor Nesson, 10 MINN. L. REv. 1057 (1986). 
197. The language of courts that condemn "selective disclosure" suggests that some such 
general currency for information may be a significant factor in their attitude. See, e.g., Permian 
Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The client cannot be permitted 
... to invoke the privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he has already compro-
mised for his own benefit."); Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62, 62 N.E. 956, 959 (1902) (Holmes, 
C.J.) ("The privacy for the sake of which the privilege was created was gone ••• , and the 
privilege does not remain under such circumstances for the mere sake of giving the client an 
additional weapon to use or not at his choice."). 
198. For an example, consider In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transport, 604 F.2d 
672 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 444 U.S. 915 (1979), in which a group of privileged 
documents was produced to the Antitrust Division by mistake. The privilege-holder did not ask 
that they be returned for a year and a half, however. Noting that by then the documents had 
been digested and shown to several grand jury witnesses, who were questioned about them, the 
court held that their confidentiality "has been so irretrievably breached that an effective waiver of 
the privilege has been accomplished." 604 F.2d at 675; see also Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 
F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (issuance of public statement regarding internal investigation 
waives privilege because it summarizes report). 
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document as an aid in cross-examination to show how the document 
affected the witness' testimony. 199 But testimony may be affected by 
documents reviewed before testifying. Accordingly, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 612 provides that in such circumstances the court can order 
that the document be turned over if that "is necessary in the interests 
of justice."200 
Rule 612 presents the litigator with an uncertain and potentially 
sweeping risk of waiver. The rule says that it applies only when the 
witness uses the document "to refresh his memory for the purpose of 
testifying." It may often be difficult to determine whether a document 
was so used, however, and some courts have suggested that the focus 
should be on the likelihood the document affected the witness' testi-
mony. 201 This approach is consistent with the purpose of the rule, but 
it poses grave difficulties for the litigator who wishes to avoid a waiver. 
Even correspondence with the client could theoretically be called for if 
the client testifies.202 Certainly the lawyer's memoranda analyzing the 
case could affect testimony if forwarded to the client/witness. The 
risk is even greater with experts hired by the lawyer. Often the lawyer 
will not know initially whether he wants to call the expert as a witness. 
The most effective way to get useful assistance from the expert is often 
to provide him access to the lawyer's analysis of the case, both as an 
introduction and to pinpoint the areas on which the lawyer needs help. 
If the expert's opinion turns out to be favorable, and the lawyer qe-
cides to call him as a witness, it is quite possible that a court will 
conclude that the introductory materials affected the expert's view of 
the case, and hence his testimony.203 
199. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 9, at 20-21. 
200. FED. R. EvID. 612. Some have suggested that rule 612 was not intended to override 
privilege claims. See Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii), Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118, 
119 (W.D. Mo. 1980); cf. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 93, at 226 (House Judici-
ary Committee report adopted "strict no-waiver position"). But a privileged document would 
not be exempt from the traditional requirement of disclosure if used by the witness while testify-
ing, where rule 612 would make disclosure mandatory, so it is odd to suggest that discretionary 
access to privileged materials is unavailable with respect to pretrial inspection. Given the risk 
that the lawyer might select privileged materials because they are privileged (and therefore ex-
empt), such disparate treatment would be unwise. As the discussion below indicates, the courts 
have not exempted such materials. • 
201. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(court reasons that, "at least to a strongly arguable degree, [the materials] may be supposed to 
have had 'an impact upon the testimony of the witness' "). For a criticism of Berkey, see Note, 
Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Product Protection Under the Fed-
eral Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 398-402 (1978). 
202. E.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 8, 
9 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (witness' review of file of correspondence with counsel mandates production of 
file). 
203. When the expert is designated a witness, a further waiver problem may arise because 
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) requires revelation of"the substance of the facts and opinions to 
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These risks can be substantially reduced through planning and the 
expenditure of more time and money on the case. We have already 
seen that, by sending a lawyer to the witness and doing all witness 
preparation orally, one can eliminate the risk of waiver at the formal 
preparation-for-testimony stage. 204 The larger the client, the less 
likely that the person engaging in regular attorney-client communica-
tions will testify. With experts, the lawyer can create a new set of 
sanitized introductory documents, do the introduction orally, or sim-
ply set the expert loose (presumably on an hourly billing basis) to 
work up his own information. This avoidance behavior increases the 
cost and reduces the quality of the professional services involved. 
It should be apparent that the events that trigger this waiver -
disclosure to client or retained expert - do not lead to a finding of 
intentional waiver or action inconsistent with the privilege involved. 
To take the easiest example, showing privileged materials to the client 
is not inconsistent with the privilege although the client is going to 
testify. Fairness, equally obviously, should provide the key to deciding 
whether to order disclosure. The problem is that fairness points both 
ways. I 
Refusing access to materials that were used in preparation for testi-
fying creates real risks of distorting the fact-finding process. At a min-
imum, there is a substantial likelihood that the memory "refreshing,, 
process will suggest things the witness does not recall or induce inap-
propriate certainty.205 Some memory-refreshing techniques create 
such a risk of distortion that courts refuse to permit persons thus re-
freshed to testify.206 With expert witnesses, moreover, the suggestions 
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion." Argua· 
bly this provision independently requires that privileged materials that form the "basis" for an 
opinion be revealed. See Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert Wit· 
ness. 85 COLUM. L. REv. 812 (1985). 
204. See text accompanying notes 42-47 supra. 
205. See, e.g., Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concerning the Psy-
chology of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. P1rr. L. REV. 547, 549· 
56 (1984) (surveying risks of witness interviews); Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Wit· 
nesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 401 (1933) ("Imagination and suggestion are twin-artists ever 
ready to retouch the fading daguerrotype of memory."); Hutchins & Schlesinger, Some Observa-
tions on the Law of Evidence - Memory, 41 HARV. L. REV. 860, 867-69 (1928) (describing 
tendency of memory "refreshment" to induce certainty of recollection although recollection not 
accurate). Presumably this risk exists only as to disclosures to witnesses, but the court in R.J. 
Herely & Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 87 F.R.D. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1980), took the reasoning a step 
further to find use by the attorney to refresh his own recollection a waiver. See 87 F.R.D. at 359. 
This added step seems entirely unwarranted, but it exemplifies existing uncertainty in the area. 
206. The customary example is hypnosis. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 35-39, 
641 P.2d 775, 784-86, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 252-55, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). See gener· 
ally McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 206, at 632-33; Note, Hypnotically Refreshed 
Testimony and the Balancing Pendulum, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 921. 
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are in effect coming from the witness' employer. 207 Indeed, there is at 
least a possibility that privileged materials were selected for witness 
preparation precisely because they are privileged, in hopes that the 
protective cloak of privilege could be drawn around the process. 208 
On the other hand, if the privileged materials were used because no 
others would do the job, that fact strengthens a need-based argument 
for disclosure of these unique materials. Some courts go to great 
lengths to minimize abuse of witness preparation in other respects, 209 
and it would be odd to exempt these critical items. 
There are countervailing factors, however. To begin with, there is 
nothing wrong with witness preparation. Whatever one may think of 
it in the abstract,210 it is a fact of life in American litigation. Indeed, a 
lawyer who fails to do it may be failing to satisfy his professional obli-
gations. 211 The preparation process itself is to some extent protected 
as work product.212 By spending more time (and money) the lawyer 
207. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that "evidence demonstrating that an economist's theory did not originate or evolve as a 
result of his own research, but rather as a result of the hiring lawyer's suggestion" could "criti-
cally alter the finder of fact's assessment of the expert's testimony"); Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985) (describing expert witnesses as 
"saxophones": "The idea is that the lawyer plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though 
the expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes."). 
208. E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(noting that "[t]here is no indication at all of a calculated plan to exploit the work product in a 
significant way for preparing the experts while planning to erect the shield of privilege against 
discovery"); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 13 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (referring to "the 
unfair disadvantage which could be placed upon the cross-examiner by the simple expedient of 
using only privileged writings to refresh recollection"). 
209. Thus, in In re Asbestos Litig., 492 A.2d 256 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985), the court forbade 
attorney-client consultation during depositions. See also Ellenberg v. Tuffy's Div. of Starkist 
Foods, Inc., 2 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 927, 935 (D. Minn. 1985) (court suggests that efforts 
by attorney to mislead or threaten witness would fall within crime/fraud exception to attorney-
client privilege). 
210. See Langbein, supra note 207, at 833: "Ifwe had deliberately set out to find a means of 
impairing the reliability of witness testimony, we could not have done much better than the 
existing system of having partisans prepare witnesses in advance of trial and examine and cross-
examine them at trial." Some therefore urge that such contacts be forbidden. See Landsman, 
supra note 205. 
211. "[A] lawyer who did not prepare his or her witness for testimony, having had an oppor-
tunity to do so, would not be doing his or her professional job properly." Committee on Legal 
Ethics, D.C. Bar, Op. No. 79, Limitations on a Lawyer's Preparation of a Witness's Testimony, 
reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Dec. 24, 1979, at 27, col. 1, at 28; accord Hamdi & 
Ibrahim Mango Co. v. Fire Assn., 20 F.R.D. 181, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See generally M. 
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 62-76 (1975). Thus, the lawyer 
may suggest language for testimony, even if the facts originate from sources other than the client, 
so long as the lawyer reasonably believes the suggestions are not false or misleading. See MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-6 (1981). This "can involve a rehearsal process 
that exceeds the length of the actual deposition." Coffee, supra note 44, at 17. 
212. In Ford v. Phillips Elecs. Instruments Co., 82 F.R.D. 359, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1979), for 
example, the court refused to require revelation of the exact questions asked by opposing counsel 
while preparing a nonparty witness. Accord Phoenix Natl. Corp. v. Bowater United Kingdom 
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can do it personally, without endangering the privilege, by telling the 
witness what is in the documents.213 But that maneuver should not 
eliminate worries about truth distortion. To the contrary, there is no 
reason why documents are needed to influence testimony.214 Perhaps 
the most famous piece of allegedly fabricated testimony in the annals 
of American trials - the seemingly memorized testimony of a prose· 
cution witness in the Triangle Shirtwaist trial in New York in 1911215 
- could hardly, with this illiterate witness, have depended on using 
documentary preparation. Moreover, the intensity of face·to·face 
Paper Ltd., 98 F.R.D. 669, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 
1975) (court may not require that witness interviews be on the record). 
An area of particular concern has been the "witness kits" that counsel are likely to prepare, 
containing selected pieces of evidence they want the witness to review with particular care. See, 
e.g., Halverson, Coping With the Fruits of Discovery in the Complex Case - The Systems Ap· 
proach to Litigation Support, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 42 (1975) ("You will want to prepare evi· 
dentiary witness kits for your witnesses .•.. "). Assuming that these materials have all been 
produced through discovery, the question remained whether the opposing party could compel 
production of the witness kit itself. 
In James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982), the court acknowl· 
edged that such a witness kit is work product because it reflects the lawyer's analysis of the facts. 
But cf. City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Home, 100 F.R.D. 740, 745-47 (D. Utah 1983) (attorneys' 
selection among discovered documents not work product). The Julian court nevertheless or-
dered the kit turned over because "[w]ithout reviewing those binders defendants' counsel cannot 
know or inquire into the extent to which the witnesses' testimony has been shaded by counsel's 
presentation of the factual background." 93 F.R.D. at 146. 
In Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 232 (1985), the Third Circuit 
rejected this view: "Proper application of Rule 612 should never implicate an attorney's selec· 
tion, in preparation for a witness' deposition, of a group of documents that he believes critical to 
a case." 759 F.2d at 318. The Third Circuit's position seems clearly preferable. Unless skillful 
witness preparation is itself unfair, the very arguments that support applying rule 612 also cut 
against requiring revelation, for they emphasize the lawyer's full preparation. The hard problem, 
with which the text deals, appears when the witness has seen materials that have never been 
disclosed to the opponent. 
213. Some courts have hinted at this possibility. Thus, one noted that a "sophisticated pro· 
spective witness [would] ... use a 'coach' who has examined the documents, rather than the 
documents themselves." Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii), Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 
118, 120 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1980); see also Barrer v. Women's Natl. Bank, 96 F.R.D. 202, 204 n.I 
(D.D.C. 1982) ("Counsel can adequately protect the attorney-client privilege by not making such 
a document available for perusal by a client to prepare for a forthcoming deposition.") (emphasis 
added); Note, supra note 203, at 826 ("requiring disclosure of work product materials may en· 
courage attorneys to influence their experts by relating the same information orally"). 
214. Even Professor Landsman, who urges that the rules regarding witness preparation be 
altered to provide that "written materials should not be offered to disinterested witnesses to 
refresh their recollections or to provide them with new information," Landsman, supra note 205, 
at 558-59, makes this proposal because documents potentially have the same impact as a number 
of oral strategies of prompting witnesses. See id. at 558. 
215. For a description of the case, leading up to the cross-examination of the witness who 
seemed to have memorized her story, see A. STEUER, MAX D. STEUER: TRIAL LAWYER 89-109 
(1950). Max Steuer, as counsel for defendants, effectively discredited the witness by having her 
repeat her story several times. Interestingly, he had expected to encounter some such memoriza· 
tion, and had tried the same cross-examination technique on two earlier witnesses. See id. at 109. 
Lest the case be thought unique, see Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactio11s to Child 
Witnesses, J. Soc. ISSUES, Summer 1984, at 139, 147 (describing child witness who repeated 
testimony seven times as lacking independent recall). 
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preparation may foster shading of testimony.216 In terms of promot-
ing independent, reliable testimony, one might prefer witness prepara-
tion at a distance using written communication over face-to-face 
encounters. Given the underlying work product concerns, it is odd to 
penalize the litigant who, due to lack of resources, lack of foresight, or 
absence of a desire to fabricate, employs a less intense method.217 
The courts are left to balance these factors in individual cases. In 
view of the substantial potential intrusion that may result from this 
waiver theory, a starting point wo1,1ld be to narrow the concept of wit-
ness preparation to the more formal activity itself. Indications of abu-
sive use of privileged material to immunize preparation218 point, of 
course, toward production. Beyond that, the basic concern is whether 
denial of access will unfairly limit the opponent's opportunities for 
cross-examination. 219 Where the witness testifies that the document 
did refresh recollection, the arguments in favor of disclosure mount 
considerably. Otherwise, in camera review of the material by the 
judge can shed light on the need for access.220 
This case-by-case process is not an easy one for judges, but it is not 
unique. Where a party requests access to grand jury transcripts of 
testimony by a witness who will testify in a civil case, the courts are 
directed to require that the party seeking access make a showing of 
"particularized need."221 Generally this determination turns on a 
216. On a somewhat analogous issue, the Supreme Court has emphasized the face-to-face 
nature of certain interactions as warranting disciplinary limitations. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (lawyer properly disciplined for face-to-face solicitation of 
client), with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (discipline forbidden where solicitation was 
through public presentation with written follow-up). See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & 
J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 20.31, at 151-54 (1986). 
217. Simple mistake may also explain the disclosure of privileged materials. For example, in 
Boring v. Keller, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1596 (D. Colo. 1983), defendant's attorney 
inadvertently included an unedited version of plaintiff's deposition summary among the materi-
als supplied to defendant's expert witnesses. Although the summaries contained the lawyer's 
impressions and evaluations of plaintiff's demeanor as a witness, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1597, the 
court ordered disclosure because "[t]he information which was shared will affect the credibility 
of the witnesses." 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d at 1600. 
218. See note 208 supra and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., Note, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of Attorney Opinion 
Work Product Provided to an Expert Witness, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1159, 1179-80 (1985) (dis-
closure should be required only where adversary hampered in cross-examination). 
220. E.g., In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350, 353 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (decision 
whether to order disclosure depends on "determination ... regarding the extent to which the 
documents were consulted and relied upon"); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 174, 
~ 612[04], at 612-40 to 612-41 (Aug. 1981) ("Unless the judge finds [from in camera review] that 
the adverse party would be hampered in testing the accuracy of the witness' testimony, he should 
not order production of any writings which reflect solely the attorney's mental processes."). For 
an example of the analysis in a case denying disclosure, see Al-Rowaishan Establishment Univer-
sal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) has been interpreted to require a showing of "particularized 
need" to justify access. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). 
1648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1605 
comparison of the witness' testimony in the civil case and before the 
grand jury, with production of the grand jury transcript "where in 
camera examination ... uncovers material discrepancy or significant 
facts which the witness concealed, or failed to remember."222 Under 
rule 612 the focus is on a different type of need, but judges should be 
able to make reliable evaluations of the need for disclosure in particu-
lar cases. Although it is certainly important to avoid making the pro-
cess too cumbersome,223 the task is worthwhile to avoid the costs that 
flow from broad waiver rules.224 Moreover, compared with the grand 
jury transcript situation, the rule 612 issue is less likely to depend on 
detailed understanding of the complicated facts of the case and more 
likely to draw on the judge's experience as a litigator. Absent indica-
tions of abuse, under rule 612 substantial latitude should be accorded 
the accepted witness-preparation process, with access ordered only in 
cases of considerable need. 22s 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FAIRNESS ANALYSIS: DOWN THE 
SLIPPERY SLOPE? 
As we have seen, the trend toward accommodating competing in-
terests with a fairness analysis for waiver sometimes requires difficult 
decisions. Beyond that, the trend can be criticized on two fundamen-
tal grounds. First, it depends on ad hoc decisions that threaten to 
undermine the privilege. Second, by stressing need the fairness analy-
sis may herald the demise of the absolute protection the privilege af-
fords. Both of these objections in essence rely on slippery-slope 
reasoning - that although failure to find a waiver in the particular 
For an elaboration of this requirement, see Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 
211, 222-24 (1979). 
222. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Pa. 
1962), quoted in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 227 (1979). It is not 
clear that courts uniformly require strong showings of need. See, e.g., Grumman Aerospace 
Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,890 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (court 
orders disclosure of grand jury testimony of specified witnesses because it was "struck by the 
overall haziness of their recall" in their depositions) (emphasis in original). 
223. Cf In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Any system that requires 
courts to make highly refined judgments - perhaps concerning volumes of documents - will 
most likely collapse under its own weight."). 
224. See Part I supra. 
225. If disclosure is ordered, the court may confront disputes about the extent of the waiver. 
Unlike the traditional subject matter waiver, it would not seem appropriate for the waiver to 
apply to anything except that which the witness reviewed. See Marshall v. United States Postal 
Serv., 88 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D.D.C. 1980) (rejecting attempt to "solder together" concept of sub-
ject matter waiver and disclosure required under rule 612). Indeed, even where the witness re· 
views materials while testifying, the court may limit the disclosure required to the parts referred 
to, in order to protect the privilege against undue incursion. See S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B. 
Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 409-10 (W.D. Pa. 1984). 
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case may be commendable the reasoning permits pernicious results in 
other cases.226 But these risks appear less significant than the costs 
that attend rigid waiver rules, and they therefore are not grounds for 
halting the current trend. 
A. Ad Hoc Decisions 
It is a truism that bright lines are desirable to make privileges relia-
ble. The fairness principle, however, often fails to provide a clear de-
lineation of the situations in which a waiver should be found. Instead, 
the court is to make a multi-factor analysis to determine whether it 
would be "fair" to allow the privilege-holder to continue to assert the 
privilege.227 Given the uncertainty of this standard, the court may be 
tempted to decide in favor of access whenever it senses that the mate-
rial involved is important, thereby undermining the privilege by mak-
ing it unreliable. 
This is a legitimate concern, and some cases suggest that courts 
will indulge suspicions about unfairness to justify finding a waiver. 
For example, while acknowledging that there was no showing of any 
"specific prejudice" to defendants resulting from plaintiff's partial dis-
closure, one court nevertheless found a waiver. "In defining the extent 
of a party's waiver of the privilege," it reasoned, "a court is not re-
quired to determine whether the party has gained any particular tacti-
cal advantage by its partial disclosure."228 But if no particulars need 
be shown, it would seem that almost any disclosure could be found a 
waiver because negating possibilities of unfairness would be a virtually 
impossible task. 
Nevertheless, concern about careless reasoning does not justify 
abandonment of the trend toward emphasizing fairness. First, it is 
simply not true that the rigid purpose analysis yields a bright line for 
waiver decisions any more than it does on other privilege issues. 229 
Instead, this approach to waiver seems to have invited courts to invent 
debatable reasons why disclosures are inconsistent with the purposes 
of the privilege.230 
More fundamentally, one may question the proposition that bright 
226. See generally Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
227. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1985) ("[T]he 
modem trend seems to be towards a case by case determination of waiver based on a considera-
tion of all the circumstances."); cf. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 5, § 77, at 186-87 
(suggesting that evolution away from utilitarian approach may lead from rigid rules to "the finer 
touch of the specific solution"). 
228. Nye v. Sage Prods., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
229. See text accompanying notes 78-93 supra. 
230. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra. 
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lines actually prevail in privilege law. In Upjohn, for example, the 
Court praised the idea of bright lines231 but refused even to articulate a 
standard for application of the privilege in the corporate context.232 
Chief Justice Burger rebuked the Court for neglecting its duty of pro-
viding guidance to the lower courts in applying the privilege.233 Simi-
larly, the longstanding crime or fraud exception has allowed courts to 
abrogate privilege protection under a standard that is hardly crystal 
clear. Although in theory limited to situations in which the client has 
sought legal advice to assist in committing the crime or fraud, the doc-
trine has been applied where the misconduct is the lawyer's idea.234 
Indeed, a recent decision in the Dalkon Shield IUD litigation suggests 
that it may apply where defendant has used "stonewalling" tactics in 
defense of litigation.235 Despite the rhetoric, then, bright lines are not 
prevalent. 
Second, the context in which waiver decisions arise inherently lim-
its the slippery-slope problem because they are keyed to some further 
act of the privilege-holder that waives preexisting privilege protection. 
Even with the "putting in issue" ground for abrogating privilege, 
where the courts often indulge dislike for the privilege instead of fo-
cusing on the unfairness of the act upon which the argument is 
based,236 there is still a further act that forms the predicate for finding 
a waiver. Properly applied, the fairness argument is limited to the im-
plications of the disclosure that prompts claims of privilege. Absent 
some such further action by the privilege-holder, there can be no 
waiver argument, and risks of broad abrogation of privilege do not 
exist. 
Third, this slippery-slope argument disregards the fact that the 
fairness analysis developed in an effort to preserve, not defeat, asser-
tions of the privilege, and it would be ironic to jettison it because it 
threatens the privilege. The problem with the prevailing purpose anal-
ysis was that courts developed a trigger-happy attitude that any disclo-
231. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or 
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little 
better than no privilege at all."). 
232. See 449 U.S. at 396-97: 
Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a set of 
rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any such approach 
would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. ... While such a "case-by-case" 
basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attor-
ney-client privilege, it obeys the spirit of the Rules. 
233. See 449 U.S. at 403-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
234. E.g., Clark v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 187, 261 S.W.2d 339, cert. de11ied, 346 U.S. 855 
(1953). 
235. /11 re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2 (D. Kan. 1985). 
236. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra. 
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sure was inconsistent with the privilege and therefore a waiver. Far 
from abrogating the privilege in situations where it would previously 
have been applied, then, the fairness analysis protects it unless there is 
some reason for removing it. 
B. Away from Absolutism? 
The second objection to the fairness analysis is broader: by empha-
sizing need, the fairness orientation threatens to abolish the absolute 
protection that is said to be the hallmark of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 237 As Judge Kaufman put it thirty-five years ago, "[t]he scope of 
the privilege contracts as the need for discovery grows."238 Undenia-
bly, the fairness analysis emphasizes need; in most contexts it limits 
waiver to those situations in which the act upon which the waiver is 
premised creates a need for further disclosures by placing the privi-
lege-holder's opponent at an unfair disadvantage. But if need is criti-
cal in that context, it arguably justifies access in the absence of some 
act that supports a waiver argument. Thus, the shift in focus could 
abolish the time-honored absolute privilege and replace it with a quali-
fied privilege akin to work product. Coupled with the alleged inability 
of courts to balance the systemic interest in privilege against the need 
for evidence in specific cases,239 this revision could "subject the privi-
lege to the hazards of fortune."240 This potential seems to have been 
realized in cases where courts reason that the privilege-holder has 
waived by raising certain issues even without using privileged 
material. 241 
The actual risks do not appear to justify concern about undermin-
ing the theoretical absoluteness of the privilege. First, the fairness ar-
gument does not accept every need as sufficient. To the contrary, it is 
not only limited to situations in which there has been some act upon 
which a waiver can be premised, it also is limited to unfairness flowing 
from that act rather than the mere existence of the privilege. The 
problem with the overbroad "putting in issue" cases is that they disre-
237. E.g., Saltzburg, supra note 91, at 299 (absolute protection the "principal difference" 
between attorney-client and work product privileges). 
238. Magida ex rel. Vulcan Dentinning Co. v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
239. E.g., Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional 
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 464 (1977) ("Courts are wholly unwilling to balance in 
discrete cases the harms of excluding evidence against the benefits of the attorney-client privi-
lege."). Thus, it has been noted that courts are most willing to find a waiver of the privilege 
against self-incrimination in criminal cases when testimony is important to guilt or innocence. 
Note, supra note 122, at 1762. 
240. Developments, supra note 6, at 1641. 
241. See text accompanying notes 133-34 supra. 
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gard this distinction. It therefore seems odd to "protect" the privilege 
by rejecting flexible waiver rules that preserve privilege protection 
where it would previously have been lost. 
Moreover, if explicit recognition of the fairness analysis leads to 
modification of other rules to cope with special unfairness resulting 
from the existence of the privilege, that is not necessarily a bad thing. 
It may well be that the broader "putting in issue" cases present situa-
tions in which the law should be adapted to accommodate such con-
cerns. 242 But the waiver format provides no analytical tools for 
developing such rules, and waiver rules should not be distorted in 
place of analysis of the underlying issues. 
Second, the absolutism of the privilege was often self-defeating be-
cause it engendered such rigid pitfalls that the theoretically absolute 
protection was too often nonexistent. A good example is provided by 
the eavesdropper cases. Animated by the absolute protection afforded 
by the privilege, Wigmore decreed that the privilege-holder bear the 
risk that the lawyer-client communication might be broached by an 
outsider, no matter how fortuitous or criminal the interception.243 
Even today, some courts hold the privilege inapplicable where inter-
lopers manage to obtain privileged material,244 although others protest 
this unfairness. 245 Thus, the theory of absolute protection may be lit-
tle more than a theory; surely we need not abandon fairness in service 
to a mirage. 
Third, pessimism about the courts' ability to weigh the privilege 
against need may be overstated. The argument is typical of slippery-
slope analysis - the courts will always find the general interest in the 
privilege outweighed by the immediate need of the opponent for rele-
vant privileged material. 246 But the objection seems more applicable 
to the traditional purpose analysis247 than to the fairness approach. 
The assumption that the material will always seem highly important is 
doubtful in civil litigation, where discovery can range far and wide.248 
Moreover, experience with opinion work product suggests that courts 
can credit the needs of privilege while evaluating need-based argu-
242. For a discussion of some such concepts, see text accompanying notes 139·44 supra. 
243. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2326. 
244. E.g., Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 
1981) (privileged materials stolen from opponent's garbage). 
245. E.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1982) 
(rejecting Wigmore doctrine as "atavistic"). 
246. See Schauer, supra note 226, at 374 (describing fear that judge will not adhere to princi-
ple when called upon to apply it as reason for avoiding slippery-slope situation). 
247. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra. 
248. See note 20 supra. 
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ments. In a recent case, for example, a divided panel of the Third 
Circuit held it was error to order production of attorney memoranda 
provided to expert witnesses. 249 Despite the strong need for access to 
such materials for effective cross-examination, 250 the court directed 
the district judge to perform an in camera review to redact all attorney 
opinions.251 The case is not unique in upholding a privilege claim de-
spite a showing of need. 252 Indeed, some find the protection of opinion 
work product to be effectively as absolute as that actually accorded 
material covered by the attorney-client privilege, despite the authority 
to order production in cases of need. 253 Balanced against the impact of 
automatic disclosure without reference to fairness or countervailing 
costs, concern that the courts will be unable to perform a genuine bal-
ancing seems unimportant. 
Finally, recent trends in other areas of attorney-client privilege law 
show that need is an emerging justification for abrogating privilege. 
Thus, recent revisions of ethical rules emphasize the attorney's duty to 
disclose client confidences to prevent client wrongdoing. 254 Although 
249. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984). The lower court's decision had 
apparently been based on the requirement of FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) that, as to testifying 
experts, the grounds for the opinions of the expert witness are to be disclosed. See 738 F.2d at 
590·91; see also note 203 supra. The panel rejected this argument, 738 F.2d at 593-95, stressing 
the special protections accorded opinion work product. 738 F.2d at 592-93. 
250. See note 207 supra and accompanying text. 
251. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595-96. 
252. For a similar example, see Leucadia, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 674 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which plaintiff's vice-president testified at his deposition that in preparation 
for the deposition he had looked at the privileged document in dispute. Defendant argued that 
this predeposition use of the document constituted a waiver, urging also that "any privilege is 
overcome by the critical importance of these documents to the litigation." 101 F.R.D. at 679. 
The court rejected these arguments, stating that "I see no facts which would warrant a discre-
tionary decision to override the privilege." 101 F.R.D. at 679; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (party seeking privileged information must 
make "strong showing of need" to breach privilege); Al-Rowaishan Establishment Universal 
Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[T]he 
value to Beatrice is outweighed by the principle precluding disclosure of this type of work-prod-
uct. "). In the same vein, recall that some courts hesitate to find a waiver as to materials disclosed 
during settlement negotiations despite persuasive reasons for disclosure. See text accompanying 
notes 150-52 supra. What these cases show is that judges can exercise self-restraint and do genu-
ine balancing on the issue of waiver. 
253. E.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973). In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 
(1981), the Court said that it was "not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is 
always protected by the work product rule," but that disclosure depended upon "a far stronger 
showing of necessity and unavailability" than would be true of other forms of work product. 449 
U.S. at 401-02. There are cases directing disclosure of opinion work product. See, e.g., AM Intl., 
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 311 (N.D. Ill. 1982), described in 
note 135 supra. 
254. See MODEL RULES 01' PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983), allowing the lawyer 
to reveal information to prevent the client from committing a crime likely to result in death or 
bodily harm. The originally proposed rule was broader, allowing disclosure to prevent crimes or 
frauds likely to result in financial harm, but it was narrowed after objections from bar 
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this provision might be analogized to the crime/fraud exception,255 it 
goes further because it does not depend on the client's misuse of the 
privileged relationship but rather rests on recognition of the greater 
need for disclosure. More telling is the rule that the lawyer may dis-
close client confidences to rebut attacks on him, whether by the client 
or others.256 Whatever the propriety of recognizing the needs of law-
yers as superior to the needs of others,257 the reality is that need-based 
limitations on the privilege are on the rise. There is no reason to reject 
more flexible treatment of waiver because it also incorporates concepts 
of need. 
CONCLUSION 
Attitudes toward waiver reflect attitudes toward privilege.258 
Courts have traditionally indulged their dislike for the attorney-client 
privilege by finding excuses for withdrawing it, couched in terms of 
the purposes of the privilege, which make preservation of the privilege 
perilous. But this attitude is costly in civil litigation, and this article 
has therefore proposed recasting the question in terms of whether 
there is a reason for withdrawing privilege protection. This shift in 
focus leads to the conclusion that waivers should be based on fairness, 
which is the emerging trend in the courts. The proper emphasis of the 
fairness analysis, in tum, is unfairness resulting from the act upon 
which the waiver argument is premised. The prime concern is that a 
groups. The narrower version has caused much controversy. See, e.g., Hall, States Modifying 
ABA's Ethics Rules, Legal Times, Aug. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 2, at 4-5. This development may be 
seen as part of an ongoing debate about the relative importance of increased access to evidence as 
opposed to client confidentiality. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: 
One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. Cow. L. REV. 349 (1981); Frankel, 
supra note 52; cf Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984) (impact of 
rules regarding lawyer's duties with regard to client perjury). 
255. See text accompanying notes 234-35 supra. 
256. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.6(b)(2) (1983); see United States v. 
Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir.) (institution of suit against lawyer not a waiver for subse· 
quent proceedings), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1518 (1986). 
257. consider the trenchant comments of Professor Rhode: 
[N]othing ... explains why disclosures to protect lay victims will erode client trust, while 
revelations to secure attorneys' financial interests will not .... Once one acknowledges that 
clients' general expectation of confidentiality can be maintained despite some limited risk of 
betrayal, it is unclear why the pecuniary concerns of lawyers should assume priority over 
the potentially more significant claims of third-party victims. 
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 615-16 (1985); see Naka· 
sian v. Incontrade, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (lawyer who sues former client 
may use confidential information about former client's affairs to attach its funds). 
258. "The courts' attitude toward the waiver varies inversely to their attitude toward the 
privilege. The greater the desire to find and maintain the privilege, the less the desire to find 
waiver and vice versa." Note, Privileged Communications Between Attorney and Client -
Waiver of Privilege, 16 MINN. L. REV. 818, 819 n.4 (1932). 
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privilege-holder may affirmatively use privileged material to garble the 
truth, while invoking the privilege to deny his opponent access to re-
lated privileged material that would put the proffered evidence in 
perspective. 
Applying this fairness analysis to recurrent civil litigation situa-
tions suggests clear resolutions for some enduring problems. Thus, the 
"putting in issue" waiver should be limited to situations in which the 
privilege-holder makes affirmative use of privileged material as evi-
dence; it should not be imposed as a tax on the decision to raise certain 
issues.259 Similarly, inadvertent revelation of damaging material to an 
opponent should not work a waiver.260 Beyond these situations, the 
fairness analysis requires a sometimes difficult assessment of the cir-
cumstances of the case in order to decide whether to find a waiver. 
Where privileged information has been shared, for example, a key 
question is whether the sharing has given it such currency that deny-
ing it to the opponent would threaten to make a mockery of justice.261 
Similarly, where material has been used in witness preparation, the 
question is whether the opponent will be unfairly hampered in cross-
examining the witness without the material. 262 
The further implications of this approach remain uncertain. Shift-
ing the focus from the waiver issue to fairness need noUead down a 
slippery slope to the demise of the privilege altogether, but expansion 
of the analysis into new areas might lead to new complexities. An 
obvious example would be relaxation of the traditional eavesdropper 
rule, which places on the privilege-holder total responsibility for en-
suring confidentiality of attorney-client communications. 263 More dif-
ficult issues may arise with extension of the analysis to criminal 
cases. 264 If these prospects deter courts from adopting this analysis, 
they may continue simultaneously to declare that the privilege is sa-
cred and to devalue it with hair-trigger waiver decisions. 265 If so, 
waiver will remain unnecessarily tricky, and privilege protection will 
remain unnecessarily perilous. 
259. See text accompanying notes 133-47 supra. 
260. See text accompanying notes 153-il supra. 
261. See text accompanying notes 165, 196-97 supra. 
262. See text accompanying notes 218-25 supra. 
263. See text accompanying notes 243-45 supra. 
264. See Hazard, Perspectives on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062 
(1978) (hard core of privilege is in criminal cases). 
265. Cf Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (allowing 
waiver of fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination without knowledge relegates privi-
lege to "second rate position"). 
